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CORPORATE DISSOLUTION IN NEW




As early as 1912, the New York Court of Appeals analogized
the closely held corporation to the partnership form of doing busi-
ness.' Thereafter, both the judiciary and legislature in New York,
as well as elsewhere, have displayed a significant awareness that
close corporations2 oftentimes are little more than partnerships
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.S. 1971, J.D., 1975
St. John's University.
Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912).
While invalidating a shareholder resolution purporting to increase the number of directors
of a corporation, the New York Court of Appeals in Ripin recognized the potential for abuse
in the dealings of majority shareholders with their minority counterparts. In describing the
plight of minority shareholders in close corporations formed under a former New York stat-
ute, the court noted:
By the Business Corporations Law three or more persons might form a corpo-
ration for any lawful business with certain specified exceptions .... Under this
statute many businesses or private enterprises which formerly had been conducted
by partnerships or individuals, became the subject of corporate control and owner-
ship. Such corporations were little more (though not quite the same as) than
chartered partnerships. There was danger, however, in the very plentitude of the
power granted to such corporations, as has been shown by the litigations in the
courts on claims of oppressive or dishonest action of the majority towards the
minority. Indeed, abuse of power by a majority in many of these private corpora-
tions had become a scandal.
Id. at 447-48, 98 N.E. at 856.
2 Although the term "close corporation" has been defined in a variety of ways, one
author has commented that "no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation
appears ever to have been worked out." Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948). Professor O'Neal in his treatise on close corporations states
that the legal profession uses the term to mean a corporation whose shares are not generally
traded on the securities markets. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §
1.02, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1971). This definition approximates the statutory language employed in
New York to distinguish the close from the publicly held corporation. For example, section
1104-a of the Business Corporation Law, dealing with special dissolution remedies available
to minority shareholders, is limited in application to corporations "no shares of which are
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market
by one or more members of a national or an affiliated securities association." N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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which have received corporate charters from the state.3 Indeed, al-
though the participants in a closely held organization select the
corporate form for a variety of reasons, including limited liability,
perpetual existence, and favorable tax treatment, they still desire
one or more of the attributes of partnership status.
To accommodate the needs of investors in fashioning their
"chartered partnership," a number of statutory provisions have
been promulgated which permit sophisticated or well-represented
shareholders to achieve desired variations from traditional corpo-
rate norms.4 In the area of corporate dissolution, for example, New
York has permitted investors to insert a provision in the certificate
of incorporation calling for the dissolution of the corporation at
the will of any shareholder or upon the occurrence of a specified
event.5 Assuming minority shareholders have had the foresight to
A different approach is embodied in a Delaware statute respecting close corporations.
The Delaware statute defines a close corporation as a corporation whose certiicate of incor-
poration (1) limits record ownership of its stock to not more than a specified number of
persons, not exceeding 30, (2) subjects all of its issued stock to one or more statutorily
permitted restrictions on transfer, and (3) provides that the corporation will make no public
offering of its stock under the Federal Securities Act of 1933. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342
(1975).
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), the court
noted that there was no generally accepted definition of a close corporation. For its pur-
poses, the court described the form of organization as "typified by: (1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation."
Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. See also Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577,
583-84 (1965).
Notably, close corporations in California may have no more than 10 shareholders.
Moreover, there must be a statement in the articles of incorporation to the effect: "This
Corporation is a Close Corporation." CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (Deering Supp. 1981).
1 It is not uncommon for courts or commentators to refer to the close corporation as a
"chartered partnership" or "incorporated partnership." See Ripin v. United States Woven
Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367
Mass. 578, 586-87, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 1.02, at 3 (2d ed.
1971); 4 J. SPIRES, DOING BusiNEss IN THE UNITED STATES § 71.01[2][b], at 71-76 (1981).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 620 (agreements as to shareholder voting and certif-
icate of incorporation provisions as to control of directors), 715 (shareholder election of of-
ficers), 616 (greater requirements as to quorum and vote of shareholders), & 709 (greater
requirements as to quorum and vote of directors) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982).
Recent decisions have indicated that when shareholders have not fully complied with statu-
tory requirements to ensure partnership-like status, courts will not necessarily defeat the
intended result. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 96-97, 405 N.E.2d 681, 682, 428 N.Y.S.2d
199, 200 (1980) (interpreting Delaware law); Adler v. Svingos, 80 App. Div. 2d 764, 765, 436
N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (1st Dep't 1981).
5 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963). Absent a provision permitted by sec-
tion 1002, voluntary dissolution of a New York corporation requires authorization by the
holders of two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote on dissolution. Id. § 1001.
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include such a provision, dissolution of the corporation can be ef-
fected in the same manner as is applicable to a partnership.6 The
focus of this article, however, pertains to the minority shareholder
who, at the time of his initial investment, failed to consider ade-
quately that, at a future date, he might desire to liquidate the cor-
poration in order to salvage all or a portion of his investment. Re-
specting this shareholder, the existing remedy of involuntary
dissolution traditionally has offered little solace.7
The plight of the minority shareholder may arise whenever
two or more persons share similar desires to profit through an in-
vestment of time, money, and effort in a corporate venture. Since
the contributions of each participant may vary, individual stock
ownership percentages may likewise differ, thereby creating a con-
trol position for one individual or group. Nonetheless, the investors
may share the expectation that they will participate in the man-
agement and control of the operation, be employed by the corpora-
tion as long as they remain shareholders, and serve as officers and
directors of the corporation. s Unfortunately, because all concerned
agree as to their particular positions and functions within the cor-
poration, a written shareholders' agreement and appropriate provi-
sions in the certificate of incorporation memorializing their expec-
tations are purposefully or inadvertently dispensed withY
Several commentators have argued that the effects of section 1002 can be obtained, without
the insertion of a provision in the certificate of incorporation, by virtue of a shareholders
agreement requiring the shareholders to vote for dissolution at the time and under circum-
stances specified in the agreement. See C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 4.30 (2d ed.
1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002, comment at 120 (McKinney 1963); Kessler, The Share-
holder-Managed Close Corporation Under the New York Business Corporation Law, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 197, 205-06 (1974).
8 Section 62 of the New York Partnership Law provides, in part, that dissolution is
caused by the express will of any partner at any time even if such action may breach the
agreement between the partners. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 62 (McKinney 1948).
7 See Note, Corporate Dissolution in New York: The Leibert Standard and its Appli-
cation Today, 23 SYRAcusE L. REV. 873 (1972).
' See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554,
561 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1980) (citing Note, Relief to Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnership
Precepts and Related Considerations, 1974 Amz. L.J. 409, 412).
1 Professor O'Neal has summarized the *situation of the minority shareholders as
follows:
A person taking a minority position in a close corporation often leaves himself
vulnerable to squeeze out or oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders'
agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw provisions .... He may be unaware of
the risks involved, or his bargaining position may be so weak that he is unable to
negotiate for protection. Further, he may have been given or may have inherited
[Vol. 56:24
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To the participants' dismay, however, disagreement ultimately
may develop and the minority shareholder may find himself re-
moved from his directorship, office, and employment by action of
the controlling faction. Undoubtedly, those in control will attempt
to justify their action by citing the minority shareholder's alleged
uncooperative attitude or other supposed misbehavior. In any
event, the ousted shareholder, stripped of employment which may
represent the primary source of his income, remains the owner of
stock which has no immediate value. The shares of the close corpo-
ration typically do not return a dividend. Moreover, since a minor-
ity position in a close corporation, unlike its publicly held counter-
part, usually lacks marketability, the shareholder is frustrated by
the realization that he cannot sell his shares.10 Furthermore, the
minority shareholder may receive an offer from the controlling in-
terests to purchase his shares at a price which the minority share-
holder unquestionably will deem inequitable. The shareholder then
is confronted with the unenviable choice of selling his shares for a
seemingly inadequate price or remaining as a perpetually impotent
participant in the venture.
Until recently, a shareholder finding himself in such a position
possessed no adequate statutory means for obtaining dissolution of
the venture."' In 1979, however, New York added sections 1104-a
his minority interest. Finally, his lawyer... may not have the knowledge, experi-
ence and skill necessary to draft effective protective arrangements.
F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.03, at 582 (1975).
Professor Hetherington indicates that the attorney purportedly representing the minor-
ity shareholder may be to blame for any later predicament:
The tacitly assumed model of a close corporation is that of a group of business-
men who decide-often on the advice of an attorney-to incorporate. In the usual
case, only one lawyer is consulted .... [W]here there is to be minority stock in-
terest, or where there are more than two parties, the situation [confronted by such
attorney] is... difficult. The exposure of the participant who takes a minority
stock position in a close corporation to exploitation is serious, and the lawyer
would appear to have a duty to explain the risks of this position. Conversely, the
party taking the majority position has an interest in obtaining a strong control
position. At this point it becomes difficult for the lawyer to represent both parties.
Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969
ILL. L.F. 1, 16-17.
10 See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554,
560 (1979), afl'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980). See also Note, Some Specific
Needs Of the Close Corporation Not Met Under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act:
Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1008, 1025 (1970).
11 See text accompanying notes 30-50 infra. Courts have exercised "inherent equity
power" to dissolve a corporation in the absence of express statutory authorization. See text
accompanying notes 51-84 infra.
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and 1118 to its Business Corporation Law (BCL) in an effort to
afford some relief to aggrieved minority shareholders. 12 Among
other things, these provisions permit holders of twenty percent of
the outstanding shares of a corporation to petition for judicial
dissolution on grounds of oppressive actions practiced upon the
complaining shareholders by directors or others in control of the
business."3 Additionally, the corporation and noncomplaining
shareholders are permitted to avoid dissolution by purchasing the
petitioning shareholders' stock at its fair value.' 4
Shortly after these sections were enacted, a New York court
was presented with the first opportunity to consider a share-
holder's petition seeking dissolution on the basis of oppressive con-
duct. In In re Topper,'5 the Supreme Court, New York County,
determined that a shareholder has been subjected to oppressive
conduct within the meaning of section 1104-a when those in con-
trol of the corporation have acted in such a manner as to defeat
those expectations of the minority shareholder which formed the
basis for his participation in the venture.'6 In enunciating this
"reasonable expectations test,"'7 the court has substantially en-
larged the options of a minority shareholder in a dissolution con-
text. If the Topper decision is followed, 8 the effect of the statutes,
as so interpreted, will be to reduce the remaining gap between
treatment of the close corporation and partnership forms of busi-
ness organizations.
This article will focus upon the addition to the arsenal of mi-
nority shareholders' rights evidenced by sections 1104-a and 1118
of the BCL and their unique application in Topper. Section I ex-
amines the law of involuntary dissolution as applied to minority
shareholders in New York close corporations prior to the adoption
12 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 1104-a & 1118 (MeKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see text ac-
companying notes 85-113 infra.
1 Id. § 1104-a.
14 Id. § 1118.
16 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
16 Id. at 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 366. A standard for dissolution based upon the unfulfilled
reasonable expectations of minority shareholders previously had been recommended by
commentators. See Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders:
A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REv. 1043, 1063 (1969); O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 885-88 (1978).
17 In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
16 To date, the Topper decision has been cited favorably in two subsequent opinions of
the same court. See In re Beshar, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County); In re Taines, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
[Vol. 56:24
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of sections 1104-a and 1118. Section II undertakes an analysis of
the recently enacted statutes and the reasonable expectations test
enunciated in Topper. Section III considers the potential short-
comings of the statutory provisions and suggests provisions which
may alleviate several of the problems relating to this area.
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION PREDATING SECTION 1104-A
With characteristic insight, Professor Israels has noted that
"the objective of the participants in a close corporation is to
equate the scheme of governance of their enterprise to that of a
partnership."'19 Recognizing this desire, legislatures have made
available a "clear, if technical, path"20 whereby shareholders could
structure their arrangement to achieve partnership-like status free
from the threat of unlimited liability. Accordingly, provisions to
alter typical corporate attributes could be embodied in a certificate
of incorporation2 or in a separate shareholder's agreement.22 Fail-
19 Israels, supra note 2, at 491. Professor Israels notes that in either the corporate or
partnership form, the participants in a "family" enterprise seek veto power over (1) the
admission of new participants, (2) matters of ordinary administration, and (3) basic struc-
tural changes. Id.; see, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 120-21, 128-29,
60 N.E.2d 829, 832, 836-37 (1945).
20 Israels, supra note 2, at 506.
21 Corporate statutes have permitted partnership-like status pursuant to an enabling
charter provision. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 620(b) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982) per-
mits a provision to be inserted in the certificate of incorporation which would restrict the
management function of the board of directors or transfer to one or more shareholders or
their designees all or any part of the management of the business. This provision was in-
tended to expand the holding in Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 417, 199 N.E. 641, 643
(1936), which upheld an agreement among all shareholders in a close corporation which in-
fringed upon certain managerial functions of the directors. The provision also was intended
to overrule Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 179, 77
N.E.2d 633, 635 (1948), McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 330, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (1934),
and Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322-24, 119 N.E. 559, 562-63 (1918), each of which had
invalidated shareholder agreements removing in whole or in part the management function
of the board of directors. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 198-99. Use of such a provision
permits the shareholder to create a situation corresponding to the equal management rights
of all partners. See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40(5) (McKinney 1948).
Sections 616 and 709 of the New York Business Corporation Law are also relevant in
that they permit the certificate of incorporation to include provisions calling for greater
than normal quorum requirements at shareholders' and directors' meetings, as well as provi-
sions respecting voting by shareholders and directors. N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAw §§ 616 & 709
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982). For maximum protection of minority shareholders,
provisions can be inserted which will call for 100% quorum and unanimous voting require-
ments. In such manner, each shareholder and director retains veto power over all matters
coming before the shareholders, and board, respectively. As a result, the corporation func-
tions much like a partnership wherein, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
30 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:24
ure to comply with the precise statutory formula for implementa-
nonordinary acts require approval by all partners. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 40(5), 40(8)
(McKinney 1948).
Also of note is section 715(b) of the New York Business Corporation Law which permits
the participants to include a provision in the certificate of incorporation calling for election
of officers by the shareholders instead of by the board. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 715(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1963). Finally, various provisions of the New York statute indicate that the certifi-
cate of incorporation may be used to alter the voting rights of shareholders. E.g., id. § 501(a)
(permits the division of stock into two or more separate classes); § 703(a) (provides that the
certificate of incorporation can call for the election of one or more directors by the holders
of any class). In such manner, classes can be established to ensure participation by repre-
sentatives of minority shareholders on the board of directors in instances where such in-
volvement would otherwise be nonexistent. See, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222,
226-27, 222 A.2d 800, 803 (1966), wherein classifications were used to create representation
for two families on the board of directors and as a means of avoiding deadlock.
22 A principle area wherein traditional corporate norms are altered by separate agree-
ment relates to restrictions on transferability of stock. Assuming a market exists, corporate
shares may be sold at the will of the owner and without seeking any prior consent from
fellow shareholders. The purchaser thereafter acquires all rights of a shareholder in the cor-
poration. In contrast, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, a new partner cannot
enter the partnership without the consent of all existing partners. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §
40(7) (McKinney 1948). A partner can assign or sell his interest in the partnership. Such
sale or assignment, however, only conveys to the purchaser the right to receive the seller's
share of partnership profits and surplus. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 53 (McKinney 1948).
Courts have reacted favorably when parties attempt to equate their corporation to the
partnership form by placing restrictions on free transferability of shares. First refusal provi-
sions, namely, prohibiting sales unless such shares are offered to the corporation or to other
shareholders at a previously agreed upon price or at the price offered by a third party,
typically are upheld. See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 543, 141 N.E.2d
812, 817, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1957); Hassel v. Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 655, 212 N.Y.S.
561, 562 (2d Dep't 1925); In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 368, 189 A.2d 586, 590 (1963).
See also Triggs v. Triggs, 46 N.Y.2d 305, 307, 385 N.E.2d 1254, 1254, 413 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326
(1978). Consent restrictions, prohibiting a transfer without the prior approval of the board
of directors or shareholders, are more likely to encounter difficulties as to their enforceabil-
ity. In New York, such restrictions are enforceable if such consent cannot be unreasonably
withheld. If consent can be withheld for any or no reason, the restriction is considered an
unreasonable restraint and void. See Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481, 485, 288 N.Y.S.2d
662, 666 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 23 N.Y.2d 759, 244 N.E.2d 469, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1968).
Unlike New York, Delaware has adopted an extensive statute dealing with restrictions
on transfer. Sections 202(c) and (d) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provide, in
part:
(c) A restriction on the transfer of securities of a corporation is permitted by
this section if it:
(1) Obligates the holder of the restricted securities to offer to the
corporation or to any other holders of securities of the corporation or to
any other person or to any combination of the foregoing, a prior oppor-
tunity, to be exercised within a reasonable time, to acquire the restricted
securities; or
(2) Obligates the corporation or any holder of securities of the cor-
poration or any other person or any combination of the foregoing to
purchase the securities which are the subject of an agreement respecting
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
tion of these changes traditionally has subjected the participants
to such corporate mainstays as, for example, majority rule and sep-
aration of ownership from management.2" In recent years, however,
a trend has developed which seemingly relaxes certain of the con-
straints which prevented attainment of the participants' objectives
absent unswerving compliance with statutory formality. In several
instances, courts have displayed a willingness to apply partnership-
like standards notwithstanding faulty implementation" or silence
the purchase and sale of the restricted securities; or
(3) Requires the corporation or the holders of any class of securities
of the corporation to consent to any proposed transfer of the restricted
securities or to approve the proposed transferee of the restricted securi-
ties; or
(4) Prohibits the transfer of the restricted securities to designated
persons or classes of persons, and such designation is not manifestly
unreasonable.
(d) Any restriction on the transfer of the shares of a corporation for the pur-
pose of maintaining its status as an electing small business corporation under sub-
chapter S of the United States Internal Revenue Code [26 U.S.C. § 1371-1379
(1976 & Supp. 1I 1979)] is conclusively presumed to be for a reasonable purpose.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c), (d).
An additional area wherein the parties by agreement may alter corporate attributes
involves shareholder voting agreements. Indeed, courts have enforced agreements wherein
the parties (1) agreed in advance as to how their votei would be cast during the contract
term or (2) agreed to cast their votes in the future in such manner as would be later agreed
upon pursuant to a method fixed within the agreement. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 617-18, 53 A.2d 441, 445 (1947).
Such agreements have also found statutory acceptance. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620(a)
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982).
Not to be omitted is reference to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which permit
certain corporations and their shareholders to be treated for tax purposes in a manner simi-
lar to partnerships and partners, respectively. Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
permits most close corporations to elect partnership-like tax treatment. Thus, the corpora-
tion acts only as a conduit for tax purposes and as such pays no income tax on corporate
profits. I.R.C. §§ 1372(a), 1372(b). Like partners, however, the shareholders of a Subchapter
S corporation pay tax on their share of corporate profits and derive the tax advantages of
operating losses. Id. §§ 1373, 1374. Notably, recent amendments to the tax laws have in-
creased the number of corporations eligible to elect Subchapter S status by raising the max-imum number of shareholders that a Subchapter S corporation may have from 15 to 25. Id.
§ 1371(a).
21 See, e.g., Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 705, 209
N.E.2d 553, 553-54, 261 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (1965) (refusing to enforce a bylaw provision
calling for a two-thirds shareholder vote to amend certain bylaws); In re William Faehn-
drich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 473, 141 N.E.2d 597, 600, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1957) (invalidating
a bylaw provision which attempted to establish a greater than normal quorum requirement
for shareholders' meetings).
24 Several decisions by New York courts illustrate some degree of tolerance when share-
holders have attempted to alter their relationships. In Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d
419, 271 N.E.2d 520, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1971), three shareholders, who held all the outstand-
19811
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on the part of shareholders.2 5
ing stock of a corporation, entered into an agreement calling for, inter alia, supermajority
voting requirements for certain director and shareholder actions. The agreement further
provided that "if any illegal provision [of the contract] can be cured by amending the certif-
icate of incorporation, the parties agree to take such action immediately." Id. at 423, 271
N.E.2d at 522, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 675. While noting that the supermajority voting require-
ments were invalid in the absence of a certificate of incorporation provision, the court held
that the remedy of specific performance would lie to enforce the contract provision calling
for amendment of the certificate. Id. at 425, 271 N.E.2d at 523, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 676. See
also Shubin v. Surchin, 27 App. Div. 2d 452, 454, 280 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1st Dep't 1967). In
Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980), a shareholders' agree-
ment had been executed which provided that, except as otherwise specified in the agree-
ment, no business or activity of the corporation could be conducted without the consent of a
minority shareholder. In applying Delaware law, the court of appeals held that the agree-
ment was enforceable as between the original parties to it notwithstanding the fact that all
steps required by statute had not been taken. The court noted that the public policy of
Delaware did not prevent the shareholders from removing all management functions from
the board of directors. Id. at 100-01, 405 N.E.2d at 684, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 203. Moreover, the
shareholder seeking to avoid the effect of the agreement had agreed to do all things reasona-
bly required to effectively evidence the intent of the agreement. Id. at 101, 405 N.E.2d at
685, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 203. As a result, the court determined that since no third persons were
affected and since all shareholders had assented to the arrangement, "the certificate of in-
corporation may be ordered reformed, by requiring [the majority stockholder] to file the
appropriate amendments, or more directly he may be held estopped to rely upon the ab-
sence of those amendments from the corporate charter." Id. at 102, 405 N.E.2d at 685, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 204. Finally, the court, after noting the existence of section 620(b) of the New
York Business Corporation Law, stated that no New York public policy prevented the
court's application of Delaware law in this matter. Id. at 102-03, 405 N.E.2d at 686, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 204.
Shortly after Zion was decided, a provision in a shareholders' agreement relating to a
New York corporation was held valid notwithstanding the fact that the clause provided that
all corporate operations required unanimous consent of the shareholders and that no ena-
bling provision under section 620(b) had been inserted in the certificate of incorporation. In
so holding, the court noted that "the parties intended that the ministerial act of amending
the certificate of incorporation would be accomplished to effectuate the agreement's provi-
sions." Adler v. Svingos, 80 App. Div. 2d 764, 765, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (1st Dep't 1981).
215 One area wherein a close corporation most resembles a partnership involves fiduciary
obligations among the participants. The fiduciary relationship among partners, coupled with
the utmost good faith attendant thereto, is fundamental to the partnership form of doing
business. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Each
partner shares in the profits derived and losses sustained through the combined efforts of all
partners, and each may be bound by the actions of his colleagues. See N.Y. PARTNEMSP
LAw §§ 20 & 40 (McKinney 1948). As a result, the partners tend to place a great deal of
reliance upon each other and derive a measure of protection from the fiduciary standards
placed on each participant.
Like their partnership counterparts, shareholders in a close corporation are dependent
on one another in connection with the business. Accordingly, similar concepts of fiduciary
responsibility have been applied particularly to protect minority shareholders from poten-
tial inequities at the hands of the controlling shareholders. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 76-77 (10th Cir. 1967); Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-87 (D.C.
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The area of corporate dissolution, however, traditionally has
resisted the trend to treat shareholders of a closely held corpora-
tion in a manner akin to their partnership counterparts. Pursuant
to partnership statutes, any partner, including one with a minimal
interest in the business, is empowered to force dissolution of the
partnership.26 Prior to the enactment of section 1104-a of the BCL,
however, statutory provisions in New York placed substantial, if
not insurmountable, obstacles in the path of minority shareholders
seeking to dissolve a corporation in the absence of an enabling
charter provision.27 Moreover, the judiciary, while recognizing the
inequities which may be suffered by minority shareholders in a
close corporation, was reluctant to order dissolution,28 equating
such action to "judicially imposed death. ' '29
Traditional Statutory Remedies
Despite repeated efforts to improve the position of minority
shareholders of close corporations,3 0  the New York statutory
scheme, prior to the adoption of section 1104-a, offered little to an
aggrieved minority shareholder with respect to standing to petition
for judicial dissolution. For example, Article 11 of the BCL, in ad-
dition to sanctioning involuntary dissolution at the behest of the
state attorney general 1 or the corporation's board of directors,3 2
Cir. 1957); Pernman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-49, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (1976); Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 589, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-13 (1975); Schwartz v.
Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 491, 335 N.E.2d 334, 337, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (1975); Katzowitz v.
Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 518, 249 N.E.2d 359, 363, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (1969); Modlin v.
Licht, 224 App. Div. 614, 615, 231 N.Y.S. 265, 266 (2d Dep't 1928), aff'd mem., 252 N.Y. 589,
170 N.E. 154 (1929); Levine v. Styleart Press, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 106, 107, 217 N.Y.S.2d 688,
689 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
28 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 62 (McKinney 1948).
27 See notes 30-50 and accompanying text infra.
28 See notes 51-84 and accompanying text infra.
29 In re Radom & Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954). See also In re
Gordon & Weiss, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 279, 282, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843 (1st Dep't 1969)
(McGivern, J., dissenting) where a decree of dissolution was described as "a judicial thun-
derbolt [that] sundered the corporation."
30 See, e.g., Consultant's Report No. RR-70, STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY REviSION OF THE CORPORATION LAWS 2-3 (1958), wherein it was sug-
gested that the judicial dissolution provisions be altered to permit standing by any share-
holder. Curiously, prior to 1929, a single shareholder or director of a New York corporation
was permitted to seek dissolution. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 172 (McKinney 1917), as
amended by ch. 650, § 103, [1929] N.Y. Laws 1544.
21 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1101(a) (McKinney 1963) provides:
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permits the holders of a majority of all outstanding voting shares
to adopt a resolution effectively calling for the dissolution of the
corporation.33 The resolution must state (1) that the shareholders
find corporate assets insufficient to discharge liabilities or (2) that
dissolution would be beneficial to the shareholders.3 4 Upon adop-
tion of the resolution, the shareholders may petition for judicial
dissolution. The decision to dissolve the corporation, however,
rests in the court's discretion.3 5
While the statute is significant insofar as it provides an avenue
for dissolution when a two-thirds vote of shareholders approving
voluntary dissolution cannot be obtained, 6 it is readily apparent
that the majority voting requirement of the provision obviates its
usefulness for the minority. At best, since the shareholders' meet-
ing held to consider the resolution may be called by the holders of
(a) The attorney-general may bring an action for the dissolution of a corpora-
tion upon one or more of the following grounds:
(1) That the corporation procured its formation through fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or concealment of a material fact.
(2) That the corporation has exceeded the authority conferred upon it by law,
or has violated any provisions of law whereby it has forfeited its charter, or carried
on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal
manner, or by the abuse of its powers contrary to the public policy of the state has
become liable to be dissolved.
2 Id. §. 1102. This section permits a majority of the board of directors to adopt a reso-
lution stating (1) that corporate assets are insufficient to discharge liabilities or (2) that
dissolution would be beneficial to shareholders, and to thereafter petition for judicial
dissolution.
"' Id. § 1103(a). This section, while of no utility for minority shareholders, is an im-
provement over prior law. Previously, only the board of directors could petition for dissolu-
tion on these grounds. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1943), as amended by N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 1102 (McKinney 1963); see Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corpo-
ration in New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 12-
13 (1961).
11 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1103(a) (McKinney 1963). Assuming a petition is filed pursu-
ant to this section it is not as yet certain what must be established to support dissolution. I.
KANTROWITZ & S. SLUTSKY, WHITE ON NEW YORK CORPORATIONS 1102.02, at 11-13 (1981).
With respect to a petition based on inability to discharge liability, one author argues that
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense is contemplated, that is, total liabilities must exceed
total assets. O'Connell, Dissolution as a Remedy for Dissension and Deadlock in the New
York Closely-Held Corporation, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 585, 586 (1970). In construing a prede-
cessor statute, however, the court in In re Gail Kiddie Clothes, Inc., 56 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup.
Ct. Orange County 1945) also required a showing that the corporation was unable to pay its
debts in the ordinary course of its business. Id. at 119. With respect to "benefit to share-
holders" as supporting dissolution, no court has apparently had the opportunity to apply
this standard.
35 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1111 (McKinney 1963).
31 See id. §§ 1001, 1103, comment at 172 (McKinney 1963).
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ten percent of all outstanding voting shares, 7 the statute may be
used by the minority only as a limited nuisance vehicle. At worst,
the statute may be invoked by a simple majority in an attempt to
freeze out the minority, through dissolution and liquidation, from
an interest in the corporation. Fortunately, however, courts have
been disposed to prevent dissolution on the petition of the major-
ity when the majority is motivated by bad faith, fraud, or other
breach of trust.3 5
Also of limited significance for the minority shareholder is sec-
tion 1104 of the BCL, which authorizes involuntary dissolution on
the grounds of deadlock and dissension.3 9 More specifically, disso-
lution may be sought by the holders of one-half of the outstanding
voting shares of the corporation 0 if (1) the directors are so divided
in their management function that sufficient votes for board action
cannot be obtained, (2) division among shareholders is such that
the election of directors cannot be obtained, or (3) internal dissen-
sion among the shareholders makes dissolution beneficial for the
shareholders.' 1 Section 1104 further provides that if a super-
majority voting requirement for board or shareholder action ex-
ists, 42 the percentage stock ownership required to petition for dis-
solution under" this section would be reduced to one-third. 3
Finally, any shareholder may petition for judicial dissolution upon
the sole ground that the shareholders have failed for at least two
consecutive annual meetings to elect successors to directors whose
37N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1103(b). To avoid abuse, a meeting sought by a minority
shareholder pursuant to this section may not be called more than once in any 12 month
period. Id.
See Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 196, 123 N.E. 148, 152
(1919).
3" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 1963).
1* Id. § 1104(a).
"I Id.; see, e.g., In re Sheridan Constr. Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 390, 392-93, 256 N.Y.S.2d
210, 211-12 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 680, 209 N.E.2d 290, 261 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1965). In
Sheridan, the court stated that, pursuant to section 1104 of the Business Corporation Law,
if management of a corporation is so divided that the board is totally ineffective in manag-
ing the corporation, then "dissolution is the only practical and feasible solution." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
42 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616(b) (McKinney 1963). Section 616(b) permitsthe certifi-
cate of incorporation to provide that the proportion of shareholder votes needed for the
transaction of any business by shareholders shall be greater than the proportion normally
required in the absence of such a provision. Id. A similar statutory provision exists with
respect to action taken by the board of directors. Id. § 709(a)(2).
43 Id. § 1104(b).
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terms have expired. 44 This latter provision has been over-enthusi-
astically referred to as "the ultimate in legislative recognition of
the true 'partnership' character of the close corporation.
4 5
While section 1104 ostensibly aids minority interests, the prac-
tical effect of the provision as a remedial device is negligible. In-
deed, the fifty percent stock ownership requirement has been set
sufficiently high so that minority shareholders effectively are fore-
closed from using the provision. The high ownership requirements
are particularly bothersome in light of the apparent purpose of the
ground for dissolution relating to internal shareholder dissension.
This provision was adopted in order to clarify the fact that dissolu-
tion may be a reasonable remedy when dissension among share-
holders, particularly those in close corporations, makes continu-
ance of the business unworkable and disadvantageous to the
shareholders." If such be the case, and the aggrieved shareholder
can convince a court that dissolution should be ordered, the share-
holder's holdings in the corporation seem of little significance.47 In
fact, the Model Business Corporation Act requires no similar per-
centage ownership requirement. 48 Furthermore, the reduced per-
centage set forth when supermajority voting requirements are ap-
plicable does not alleviate the problem. Surely, if the minority has
inserted supermajority voting requirements in the corporate char-
ter as a means of control over the majority, one would expect the
insertion of a further provision ensuring the availability of volun-
tary dissolution upon the happening of specified events, including
approval by the minority.
49
Moreover, although section 1104 sanctions dissolution based
upon a failure to elect directors or upon board deadlock, such pro-
visions are of little comfort to the minority. If no shareholders'
agreement exists or the shareholders have not produced a certifi-
41 Id. § 1104(c).
41 Hoffman, supra note 33, at 19.
41 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104, comment at 175 (McKinney 1963).
47 See Note, Minority Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1068, 1080 (1967).
48 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 97 (1972), provides in part:
The... courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable
injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof ....
4" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963).
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cate of incorporation altering traditional corporate norms, the ma-
jority will control the election of directors. Accordingly, deadlock
among the shareholders preventing the election of directors simply
will not exist. Moreover, once the majority has obtained control of
the board, it is unlikely that directors will pursue their duties in
such a manner as to result in management deadlock. Finally, the
ability of the majority to elect its directors causes the statutory
provision covering failure to elect directors for two consecutive an-
nual meetings to be a hollow right of the minority.
A cursory review of the statutory scheme existing prior to sec-
tion 1104-a indicates, therefore, that notwithstanding the ability of
shareholders to petition for judicial dissolution in the event of in-
solvency, deadlock, or dissension, the statutes are of no real signifi-
cance to shareholders who, in the aggregate, own less than fifty
percent of the corporation's stock. While there may be legitimate
reasons for establishing a minimum ownership percentage prior to
invoking the relief envisioned, such as the avoidance of strike or
nuisance suits,50 the percentages chosen seem excessive. A reduc-
tion in the percentage requirements coupled with continued discre-
tion in the courts to order dissolution would realistically balance
the respective positions of minority and majority shareholders.
Nonetheless, the high percentage requirements exist and, prior to
1979, represented the exclusive means by which shareholders could
petition for corporate dissolution. Consequently, the statutory
remedy of involuntary dissolution had been effectively withheld
from minority shareholders.
Judicially Sponsored Dissolution
Recognizing the tenuous position of minority shareholders in
closely held corporations, courts have evinced a desire to redress
wrongs notwithstanding the absence of statutory authorization for
dissolution. Courts have indicated that, while there may exist no
express statutory authority for dissolution at the behest of the mi-
nority, such relief may be available as a matter of "judicial spon-
50 See Comment, Dissolution Under the California Corporations Code: A Remedy for
Minority Shareholders, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 595, 617 (1975), wherein the author noted that
a minimum percentage for a dissolution petition was adopted by the California legislature
due to its apprehension regarding strike suits. The author recognized that such require-
ments and concern for the majority can "unfairly prejudice close corporation shareholders."
Id.
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sorship."' To date, however, such relief has been granted spar-
ingly. Since 1963, four decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
have touched upon this issue, intimating that the minority effec-
tively may resort to the judicially created remedy only in the most
egregious instances of overreaching by the majority.52
While courts and commentators for some time had considered
the advisability of equitable remedies for the minority in the ab-
sence of a statute,53 the first decision wherein the Court of Appeals
adopted involuntary dissolution via "judicial sponsorship" was Lei-
bert v. Clapp.54 In Leibert, the plaintiff instituted a class action on
behalf of minority shareholders to compel the directors of a con-
cededly profitable and dividend-paying corporation to commence
dissolution proceedings.5 The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the
directors and others in control of the corporation had looted corpo-
rate assets, continued the corporation for the sole benefit of those
in control, and attempted to coerce the minority to sell their inter-
ests to the control group.56 The defendants responded with a mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.57
In reviewing the plaintiff's contentions, the court agreed that
dissolution through judicial sponsorship may serve as an alterna-
Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 315, 196 N.E.2d 540, 541, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104
(1963).
'2 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Hamilton, 29 N.Y.2d 842, 277 N.E.2d 787, 327 N.Y.S.2d 855
(1971), aff'g 35 App. Div. 2d 715, 715, 315 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (1st Dep't 1970); Nelldn v. H.J.R.
Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 549-50, 255 N.E.2d 713, 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454, 459 (1969);
Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965), af'g 22 App. Div.
2d 916, 917, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (2d Dep't 1964); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 316,
196 N.E.2d 540, 542, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1963).
53 See, e.g., Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 645, 248 N.Y.S. 387, 391-92 (1st Dep't
1931); Hoffman, supra note 33, at 13-14; Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate
Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder,
40 COLUM. L. REv. 220, 222 (1940).
13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963). The Liebert decision has
spawned a substantial amount of commentary. See, e.g., Note, Dissolution of the Close
Corporation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 239, 250-51 (1966); Note, Corporate Dissolution in New
York: The Leibert Standard and Its Application Today, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 873, 874-86
(1972); Comment, New York Broadens Availability of Involuntary Dissolution as Remedy
for Intracorporate Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 697, 699-705
(1964).
-- 13 N.Y.2d at 320, 196 N.E.2d at 545, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 108. Prior to Leibert, equitable
dissolution appeared restricted to corporations that were not profitable. See Kroger v.
Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 643, 248 N.Y.S. 387, 391 (1st Dep't 1931); Note, Corporate Disso-
lution in New York: The Leibert Standard and Its Application Today, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv.
873, 875 (1972).
16 13 N.Y.2d at 315-16, 196 N.E.2d at 542, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
57 Id. at 315, 196 N.E.2d at 541, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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tive to statutory authorization for such a remedy." As to this par-
ticular action, the majority noted that the allegations, if estab-
lished at trial, were sufficient to furnish a basis for relief
notwithstanding the profitability of the corporation and the availa-
bility of alternative relief through the mechanism of a share-
holder's derivative suit against the alleged wrongdoers."9 While
noting that the legislature had vested decisions as to the desirabil-
ity of, or need for, dissolution in the directors and majority share-
holders, the court recognized that such determinations were to be
made in their capacity as fiduciaries, in good faith and in consider-
ation of the interests of both majority and minority shareholders. 0
The court further reasoned that if the allegations of the complaint
were accepted as true, the directors and majority shareholders had
indeed breached the fiduciary duty they owed to minority share-
holders, and thus were "disqualified from exercising the exclusive
discretion and dissolution power given to them by statute."' Upon
such disqualification, the court posited that it could fill the resul-
tant void.2
Armed with the potential for dissolution sanctioned in Lei-
bert, minority shareholders might well have anticipated that the
traditional judicial reluctance to decree dissolution on their behalf
would subside. It shortly became evident, however, that such
would not be the case. In Kruger v. Gerth, 3 for example, minority
shareholders holding forty-six percent of the common stock of a
's Id. at 315, 196 N.E.2d at 541, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
9 The court determined that the charges of "persistent corporate abuses" made the
remedy of a derivative suit inadequate and inappropriate. Further, the court noted:
[I]t is alleged, inter alia, that the primary, if not the sole, purpose of preserving
[the corporation's] separate existence is to effect an unlawful diversion of large
portions of its earnings to its parent corporation and other members of the group.
If this and the other allegations of misconduct be established, it follows that to
restrict the minority shareholders to a derivative suit would be to commit them to
a multiplicity of costly, time-consuming and difficult actions with the result, at
most, of curing the misconduct of the past while leaving the basic improprieties
unremedied. It is the traditional office of equity to forestall the possibility of such
harassment and injustice.
Id. at 317, 196 N.E.2d at 543, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
60 Id. at 316-17, 196 N.E.2d at 542, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
61 Id. at 317, 196 N.E.2d at 543, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 105 (quoting Hoffman, New Horizons
for the Close Corporation in New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28
BROoKLYN L. REv. 1, 14 (1961)).
62 13 N.Y.2d at 317, 196 N.E.2d at 543, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
63 22 App. Div. 2d 916, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 802,
210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
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corporation sought to compel dissolution on the ground that the
corporation was incapable of producing net income over and above
the salary and bonus paid to the majority shareholder.6 4 The ma-
jority shareholder controlled the business and, each year in ques-
tion, received compensation from the corporation which consumed
almost all of the corporate earnings.8 5 Consequently, no dividends
were paid on the common stock held by the plaintiffs."' Moreover,
since the plaintiffs were not salaried officers or employees of the
corporation, they, in effect, were receiving no return relating to
their interest in the corporation. Although the corporation appar-
ently was being operated for the sole benefit of the majority share-
holder, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the majority opinion
below, refused to order dissolution. 7 In distinguishing Leibert, the
appellate division had noted that no claim had been set forth that
the majority engaged in a "calculated deflation or impairment in
the value of the capital stock in order to coerce the minority stock-
holders to sell their shares at depressed prices." '' While agreeing
that dissolution would be warranted if those in control maintained
the corporation for their own benefit at the expense of the minor-
ity, the court noted that dissolution would not be decreed on a
"meager showing" that bonuses paid to the majority disabled the
plaintiffs from receiving a fair return on their investments.6 9
Despite the negative outcome in Kruger, the decision was of
positive significance for minority shareholders in general due to the
6, 22 App. Div. 2d at 916, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
"' From 1958 to 1961, corporate sales ranged from $245,000 to $275,000. Net profits
before income taxes, however, totalled less than $2,000 per year. During this period, salary
and bonuses to the majority shareholder ranged from approximately $14,850 to approxi-
mately $16,500. Id. at 916-17, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
11 The corporation had made dividend payments on certain preferred stock. Id. at 916,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
67 Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 804, 210 N.E.2d 355, 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1965).
68 22 App. Div. 2d at 917, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
69 Id. As a result of Kruger's holding, the holders of a sizeable interest in a corporation
valued at more than $iOO,000 will receive no return on their ownership interest, will be
unable to dispose of their investments through dissolution, and as a practical matter, will be
unable to sell their interest. See Note, Corporations: Suit by Minority Shareholder of Close
Corp., 51 CORNELL L.Q. 538, 540 (1966). Of course, it is arguable that the result may be
justified by considering the particular positions of the plaintiffs and the individual from
whom they inherited their stock. The plaintiffs were operating a business in competition
with the corporation they sought to dissolve. Indeed, they had testified that their business
would profit should dissolution take place. Id. at 917-18, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02. Moreover,
the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest had been employed by the corporation until illness
forced him to retire in 1950. From 1950 to 1961, however, he continued to receive salaries
and bonuses from the corporation. Id. at 917, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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dissenting opinions therein. Particularly significant was the dissent
of Judge Fuld, who would have considered the close corporation as
a partnership for purposes of dissolution.70 Noting that partici-
pants in close corporations typically regard themselves as partners
or joint venturers, he opined that they should be subjected to the
burdens of a partnership relationship, including the ability of a
court to decree dissolution.71 More specifically, as "the fiduciary
obligation of the majority to the minority extends considerably be-
yond what would be its reach in the context of a larger or less
closely held enterprise, ' 72 breach of that obligation empowers the
court to take steps necessary to achieve a fair result. In fashioning
a remedy, Judge Fuld would have the court consider all the facts of
the case, including the parties' interests, motivations, and good
faith. Moreover, the dissent would consider relief short of dissolu-
tion, such as permitting either interest to purchase the others
shareholdings at a value determined by the court."'
The position of minority shareholders was next considered by
the Court four years later in Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp.7 4 In
Nelkin, the petitioners, who were four-ninths shareholders in a co-
operative apartment building, had entered into a shareholders'
agreement permitting shareholder-tenants of the building to be
charged a rental discounted below the fair rental value of the prop-
erty.75 While all of the shareholders initially had benefited from
this arrangement, the petitioners ultimately vacated the building,
leaving the majority shareholders to reap the sole benefit of re-
duced rentals. The net result of the bargain was that the corpora-
tion, though worth in excess of $350,000, failed to show more than
a negligible profit.7 6 Indeed, all benefits derived from the operation
70 16 N.Y.2d at 806, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
Chief Judge Desmond dissented in a separate opinion in which, relying on Leibert, he
argued that the majority had breached its fiduciary duties to the minority by continuing the
corporation solely to pay a salary and bonus to the controlling shareholder. Id. at 804-05,
210 N.E.2d at 355-56, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 806, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (Fuld, J., dissenting); see N.Y. PART-
NERSHip LAW § 62 (McKinney 1948).
72 16 N.Y.2d at 806, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 807, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5 (Fuld, J., dissenting). Judge Fuld's
dissent closely approaches the provisions of sections 1104-a and 1118 of the present Busi-
ness Corporation Law. See N.Y. PARTNERsHIm LAW § 69 (McKinney 1948).
7' 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969).
" Id. at 546, 255 N.E.2d at 714-15, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
76 Id. at 550-51, 255 N.E.2d at 717-18, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting).
Adding to the predicament of the minority shareholders was an offer for their stock made
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effectively were funnelled to the majority shareholders in the form
of discounted rentals.
Upon considering petitioners' request for dissolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the proceeding for failure to state a
cause of action. Distinguishing Leibert, the court noted that there
was no allegation that the majority was wrongfully diverting corpo-
rate assets and income for its own personal benefit." Furthermore,
as in Kruger, the court found no evidence that the majority was
guilty of looting or exploiting the corporation to the detriment of
the minority or of having breached a fiduciary obligation owed to
the minority.7 8 In fact, the court stated that the majority's conduct
was consistent with the terms of the shareholders' agreement.
Moreover, any damage sustained by the minority arose as a result
of its own voluntary conduct in vacating the premises. Dissenting,
Judge Fuld argued that a showing of looting or wrongful diversion
of assets was not a necessary prerequisite for dissolution. Instead,
the dissent asserted that the dissolution remedy should exist when
the corporation is continued solely and exclusively for the benefit
of the majority. The dissent further argued that if the corporation
neither fulfilled its original function nor served the collective in-
terests of its shareholders, no justification existed for its con-
tinuance. 9
In light of the facts and holdings in Nelkin and Kruger, it be-
came difficult to discern a situation wherein dissolution would be
decreed based on a Leibert-type allegation that the corporation
was being continued for the sole benefit of those in control. Ac-
cordingly, a showing of looting of corporate assets or attempts to
coerce the minority to sell their interests seemed essential for dis-
solution to be ordered. Moreover, the most recent decision of the
Court of Appeals on the subject of dissolution via judicial sponsor-
ship added to the uncertainty of this remedy.
In Gilbert v. Hamilton,80 the court affirmed, without opinion,
an appellate division ruling that the petitioner had stated a cause
of action for equitable dissolution. The petitioner had set forth al-
by the controlling interests for a price equal to what the minority had originally paid. Id. at
547, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57.
7 Id. at 548, 255 N.E.2d at 715-16, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 457-58.
78 Id., 255 N.E.2d at 716, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
7. Id. at 551-52, 255 N.E.2d at 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting).
80 35 App. Div. 2d 715, 315 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 842,
277 N.E.2d 787. 327 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1971).
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legations of mismanagement and had alleged that the corporation
was being carried on for the sole purpose of benefiting the defen-
dants to the detriment of the minority.81 No allegation was made,
however, that looting had taken place or that the majority was at-
tempting to freeze out the minority. 2 Nonetheless, the court re-
fused to dismiss the complaint. Unfortunately, the failure of both
the Court of Appeals and appellate division to indicate precisely
why they held as they had did little to enlighten minority share-
holders as to their rights. At a minimum, however, the decision
indicated that the standard for dissolution enunciated in Leibert
retained some, albeit uncertain, viability notwithstanding Kruger
and Nelkin.
Review of the decisions from Leibert through Gilbert readily
illustrates the difficulties encountered by minority shareholders in
seeking non-statutory dissolution. While the Leibert standard re-
mained as the appropriate guide, the reaction of the court in Kru-
ger and Nelkin evidenced the fact that a minority shareholder
might only take comfort in his position when he had alleged loot-
ing or diversion of corporate assets. It is not surprising, therefore,
that commentators have concluded that the availability of dissolu-
tion via judicial sponsorship remained a limited remedy, to be ap-
plied only in extraordinary cases.83 In short, a liberalized dissolu-
tion remedy, equating the treatment of a close corporation to that
of a partnership, would not be forthcoming based upon judicial
precedent. If anything, the precarious position of the minority
shareholder was accentuated by the decisions subsequent to
Leibert.8 4
EXPANDING INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
Given the uncertain potential for judicially sponsored dissolu-
tion after Leibert, the position of aggrieved minority shareholders
81 35 App. Div. 2d at 716, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
82 Id.
83 See I. KATm owITz & S. SLUTSKY, supra note 34, 1102.03, at 11-20.3; O'Connell,
supra note 34, at 588.
84 See also Home v. Radiological Health Servs., P.C., 83 Misc. 2d 446, 450-51, 371
N.Y.S.2d 948, 956-57 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1975). In an action by a minority shareholder
and former employee seeking dissolution of the corporation, the Home court held that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that the majority had looted or had exploited the corpora-
tion's assets for their own benefit and that a mere showing that the corporation continued
for the singular purpose of providing a salary and bonus to the majority was insufficient
grounds for dissolution.
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was unenviable. Notably, other jurisdictions already had acted to
ease the powerlessness felt by the minority.8 5 At least twelve other
states and the District of Columbia, following the lead of the
Model Business Corporation Act,"' had enacted statutes containing
more liberal standing requirements than those encountered in New
York.87 Ultimately, recognizing the disadvantageous position of the
minority shareholder, the New York legislature responded by en-
acting sections 1104-a and 1118 of the BCL.s8
The New Statutory Framework
In an attempt to broaden the standing of minority sharehold-
ers, section 1104-a permits the holders of twenty percent of the
outstanding voting shares of a corporation to petition for involun-
tary dissolution on various grounds8 9 The shareholders must allege
and prove (1) that the directors or others controlling the corpora-
tion are guilty of "illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions" toward
the complaining shareholders 0 or (2) that corporate property is
being looted, wasted, or diverted by the directors, officers, or
others in control of the corporation.9 1 Limitation of the scope of
the section to closely-held corporations is evidenced by the fact
that the statute applies only to corporations whose shares are not
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market.92
85 A memorandum of Assemblyman William B. Finnerman in support of the addition of
sections 1104-a and 1118 to the New York Business Corporation Law, noted the existence of
similar statutes in several jurisdictions and stated that it was "time for New York State to
join with other states in recognizing the need for such protection and to conform its statutes
to those of other states." Memorandum of Assemblyman Finnerman, reprinted in [1979]
N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 143, 144.
86 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 97 (1972).
87 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33.382(b) (1981); D.C. CODE § 29-931b(a) (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 607.274 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 2361-7-3 (Burns 1972); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1115 (1974); MD. CORP. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-602 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.50 (West 1969); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 294:97 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107 (Pur-
don 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008 (1979); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-134 (1975).
8 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
89 Id. § 1104-a(a).
90 Id. § 1104-a(a)(1).
91 Id. § 1104-a(a)(2).
92 Id. § 1104-a(a). Similar language is utilized throughout the New York Business Cor-
poration Law in those instances where the legislature deemed it advisable to differentiate
the treatment of the closely-held and public corporation. See, e.g., id. § 620(c) (McKinney
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Despite the legislative sanction of a dissolution remedy upon
the petition of minority shareholders, the grant of such remedy re-
mains in the discretion of the judiciary. 3 Like other involuntary
dissolution situations, the benefit to shareholders of a dissolution
is of paramount importance 94 for the court and dissolution is not
to be denied merely because the business has been or can be oper-
ated at a profit.9 5 In addition, section 1104-a specifically guides a
court in the exercise of its discretion. The provision indicates that
a court considering judicial dissolution thereunder must evaluate
(1) whether liquidation is the only feasible means for petitioning
shareholders to obtain a fair return on their investment9 6 and (2)
whether liquidation is necessary for the protection of any substan-
tial number of shareholders or petitioners27
Having to some extent alleviated the untenable position of mi-
nority shareholders in a closely held corporation, the legislature
considered the posture of the majority when confronted with a pe-
tition for dissolution premised upon section 1104-a. While the mi-
nority typically is at the mercy of the majority with respect to the
corporation, the remedy created by section 1104-a carried with it
the possibility that the party seeking dissolution may have en-
couraged the actions by the controlling faction with an eye toward
dissolution at a later date. For example, since each of the share-
holders in the corporation typically participates in the manage-
ment and operation of the business, each becomes equally knowl-
edgeable about the business and its customers. 98 Eventually,
however, the minority may feel that with its expertise and share of
capital generated by a subsequent liquidation of the business, it
may be in a position to create a new enterprise and capture the
former clientele of the dissolved business.9 9 Accordingly, the mi-
1963) (provisions in the certificate of incorporation restricting the managerial discretion of
directors); id. § 630 (liability of ten largest shareholders for wages due to employees).
:3 Id. § 1111(a).
4 Id. § 1111(b)(2).
" Id. § 111l(b)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
Id. § 1104-a(b)(1).
:7 Id. § 1104-a(b)(2).
8 Notably, a joint legislative committee suggested that the dissolution provision be
amended to permit any shareholder to avoid dissolution of the corporation by purchasing
the complaining shareholder's stock at its fair cash value. Consultant's Report No. RR-70,
STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMhITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAW
32 (1959).
99 See generally In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 11, 119 N.E.2d 563, 567
(1954) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
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nority may act to stimulate discord between corporate factions,
thereby facilitating dissolution and liquidation of the corporation
pursuant to the statute.
Recognizing the potential for minority abuse and following the
lead of several other jurisdictions, the New York legislature fash-
ioned an alternative to dissolution under section 1104-a. Pursuant
to section 1118 of the BCL, and upon the commencement of a dis-
solution proceeding under section 1104-a, any nonpetitioning
shareholder or the corporation itself may elect to purchase the
shares owned by the petitioners at fair value. 100 Such election may
be exercised at any time within 90 days after the filing of the peti-
tion or at such later time as the court shall in its discretion per-
mit.101 Since at this stage of their relationship the parties may be
unable to reach agreement on the fair value of the shares, the sec-
tion further provides that in such event the prospective purchasers
can require the court to stay the dissolution proceedings and deter-
mine the fair value of the petitioners' stock.10 2 For this purpose,
fair value is to be determined as of the day immediately preceding
the filing of the petition for dissolution.03
The "buy-out" alternative to dissolution under section 1118
provides a mechanism analogous to the appraisal remedy given to
dissenting shareholders in certain cases of fundamental corporate
changes.1 0 4 In the event the petitioning shareholder is using section
1104-a as a vehicle to recover the fair value of his investment, the
petitioner should have no objection to the resultant forced sale.105
Moreover, the majority may welcome the section 1104-a petition as
a triggering device which will force the parties to agree on a price
for the minority's interest in the business. Conversely, if the peti-
tion for dissolution is being used by the minority as a tactic to
100 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Similar provisions
have been enacted in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., MD. CORP. & AsS'NS CODE ANN. art. § 4-
603 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90 (1970); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1975).
101 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
Id. § 1118(b).
103 Id.
'0' Pursuant to section 623(h)(4) of the New York Business Corporation Law, N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1963), a shareholder entitled to appraisal rights ulti-
mately may have a court fix the value of his shares for purposes of repurchase by the corpo-
ration. Id. Such value is to be determined as of the close of business on the day preceding
the shareholder's authorization which triggered the appraisal. The court is empowered to
appoint an appraiser to gather evidence and recommend a decision as to fair value.
105 See Consultant's Report No. RR-70, STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COM-
miTTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS 33 (1959).
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reach a result other than withdrawal of its investment, the section
1118 buy-out option may remove the in terrorem effect of such pe-
tition. For example, if the minority ultimately desires to purchase
the interest of the majority or to induce other shareholders to
agree to a change in the policies of the business,106 the risk of a
purchase of the minority's shares may cause the minority to forego
any leverage which might otherwise have accrued to it by virtue of
a section 1104-a petition. Accordingly, one author has noted that
section 1118 has nullified the beneficial effects of section 1104-a,1 07
and another has noted that an oppressed shareholder who seeks a
remedy other than appraisal probably will not petition for
dissolution.108
Nevertheless, the addition of the purchase option in section
1118 is significant in that it provides a vehicle to preserve the cor-
porate existence and avoid "judicially imposed death." 109 More-
over, the buy-out provision affords the majority an opportunity to
ensure the smooth functioning of the entity free from the negative
aspects which the dissolution litigation might otherwise entail. For
example, the BCL authorizes a court presented with a petition for
involuntary dissolution to order the corporation to furnish a sched-
ule containing the names and addresses of each corporate creditor
and claimant, including those with whom the corporation has un-
fulfilled contracts.110 Thereafter, these persons are to be advised of
the pendency of the proceeding by service of a copy of the order to
show cause relating to the dissolution.1 Management, placed in
10 It has been noted that a shareholder seeking dissolution is typically striving for one
of three possible outcomes: (1) withdrawal of his investment, (2) a purchase of the other
shareholders' interests in the business, or (3) the creation of sufficient fear of dissolution in
the other shareholders that they will consent to changes in the balance of power or policies
of the business. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1977).
107 Hornstein, Supplementary Analysis of Business Corporation Law, N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW app. 1, at 127 (McKinney Supp. 1981). The author observed that experiences in other
states have indicated that similar options, when they may be asserted by a wrongdoer, have
had a chilling effect on the use of oppression statutes. Id.
208 Schaeftler, 1979 Survey of New York Law-Corporations, 31 SYRAcusE L. REv. 129,
137 (1980).
109 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
110 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1106(a) (McKinney 1963).
"I Id. § 1106(c). Section 1106(c) also calls for service of the order to show cause upon
the state tax commission, the corporation, and any other person named in the complaining
shareholder's petition. A copy of the order must be published, at least once in each of the
three weeks preceding the hearing on the petition, in one or more newspapers of general
circulation in the county in which the corporate office is located. Id. § 1106(b). Additionally,
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the uncomfortable position of having to notify corporate creditors
of the corporation's potential demise, may desire to stay the pro-
ceedings before the potentially damaging information is directly
communicated to these individuals. Section 1118 permits this op-
tion notwithstanding the controlling interest's inability to reach a
voluntary purchase arrangement with the complaining share-
holders.
Thus, sections 1104-a and 1118 provide minority shareholders
a statutory right to petition for dissolution while balancing the in-
terests of other participants in the venture. Nonetheless, the dis-
tinct possibility remains that, notwithstanding the legislative in-
tent that the remedy of dissolution should exist, courts may be
reluctant to decree dissolution. 112 A court presented with evidence
of illegal or fraudulent conduct, or of looting, waste, or diversion of
corporate assets by those in control of the corporation could be
expected to employ the dissolution remedy, as it had in the past,
to redress the wrong committed.11 Conversely, allegations solely of
oppressive conduct might lead a court to deny relief on grounds
similar to those expressed prior to the statutory enactment. Not-
withstanding the potential for judicial restraint, the position of mi-
nority shareholders was substantially enhanced by the initial judi-
cial interpretation of oppressive conduct as used in section 1104-a.
Reasonable Expectations: In re Topper
Prior to the enactment of sections 1104-a and 1118, various
jurisdictions had permitted dissolution in order to redress oppres-
sive conduct. 14 In this context, however, courts grappled with the
problem of defining oppression. 5 While no one definition had
a copy of the order and the petition are to be filed, within 10 days after the order is entered,
with the county clerk for the county in which the corporate office is located. Id. § 1106(d). A
court may place the burden of publication, service, and filing upon the corporation. Id. §
1106(e).
The potential burdens that may befall the corporation and those in control of the cor-
poration when confronted with a section 1104-a proceeding may be gleaned from a sample
form of an order to show cause. 1B BENDER'S FORMS, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1106, Form 1,
T 2 & 4 (1979).
112 See Schaeftler, 1979 Survey of New York Law-Corporations, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV.
129, 137 (1980).
... See notes 51-84 and accompanying text supra.
114 See note 87 supra.
15 See Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: A Proposed Model and Sug-
gested Remedies, 47 Miss. L.J. 476, 477 (1976), wherein the author noted that in defining
oppressive conduct "courts have ... [not provided] concrete definitions encompassing par-
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been used with consistency, several commentators suggested that
the reasonable expectations of the participating shareholders
should be significant in determining whether oppression had oc-
curred.116 For example, an investor's intention to become an active
participant in the company might constitute a basis for dissolution
if such intent was thwarted by the controlling interests.11 7 Accord-
ingly, judicial reluctance to protect minority shareholders could be
overcome "even though fraud, bad faith or, for that matter, clear
unreasonableness on the part of the directors" could not be
established." 8
As Professor F. Hodge O'Neal has noted, the highly personal
relationship of the shareholders in a close corporation justifies dis-
solution whenever those in control disappoint the minority share-
holders' reasonable expectations.1 ' Failure to provide such a rem-
edy for the shareholder who unexpectedly has been denied future
employment and who faces the likelihood of minimal or no return
on his investment would condone the majority's use of the minor-
ity's investment for its sole benefit.120 Moreover, should the court
ticular acts or a series of acts but rather have formulated sweeping abstract generalizations."
Id. As might be expected, the author further noted that such generalizations are of minimal
aid in establishing what particular facts lead to a determination of the existence of oppres-
sion for dissolution purposes. Id. at 478. For attempts at a definition of "oppression," see
Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566, 573-74, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1957) and
White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1972).
116 The most notable proponent of a reasonable expectations standard is Professor F.
Hodge O'Neal. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 7.15; O'Neal, supra note 16, at 885-88. The
concept was previously considered in Afterman, supra note 16, at 1063-65.
21 In considering oppressive conduct and dissolution under section 210 of the English
Companies Act of 1948, one author noted:
Oppression under section 210 is probably best defined in terms of the reason-
able expectations of the minority shareholders in the particular circumstances at
hand. While these expectations will vary, such an approach permits courts to take
account of all factors relevant to a given transaction or course of conduct by the
controllers.
Afterman, supra note 16, at 1063-64.
118 O'Neal, supra note 16, at 884.
119 Id. at 886.
110 Professor O'Neal set forth the following example of an instance when dissolution
should be appropriate:
If a person gives up employment with an established national or multina-
tional company to "go in business for himself" and takes virtually all of his sav-
ings and buys a minority interest in a close corporation which he and a few friends
are forming and in which they contemplate that each one of the shareholders will
be an officer or key employee and share in the control; if the business continues
for a number of years with each shareholder serving as a director, working for the
company, drawing a salary, and having a voice in business decisions, obviously it is
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justify the majority's acts by referring to statutory enabling provi-
sions, certificates of incorporation, or bylaws, or by deeming minor-
ity participation to be a "contract" with fellow shareholders, the
court, in effect, would be enforcing a one-sided and unconscionable
arrangement. 21 Accordingly, Professor O'Neal concludes that the
reasonable expectations of all the shareholders constitute "the
most reliable guide to a just solution of a dispute among share-
holders" in a close corporation. 22
The adoption of section 1104-a carried with it the potential to
thrust Professor O'Neal's theory upon a New York court. In In re
Topper,2  the Supreme Court, New York County, reacted to the
initial opportunity to interpret section 1104-a by fully embracing
the reasonable expectations approach to oppression. 124 By so hold-
unjust to permit majority shareholders to oust the minority shareholder from the
directorate and cause the corporation to discharge him from employment, espe-
cially if the corporation is paying no dividends, as is usually the case.
Id. at 887.
121 Id. at 886-88.
122 Id. at 886. It should be noted that since true negotiations among the parties are
most prevalent in the formation of the venture, emphasis on the resultant early expectations
should be of primary significance for a court.
12 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
12 Reasonable expectations as a guide to the existence of oppressive conduct had previ-
ously been used in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 153-56, 400
A.2d 554, 560-62 (1979), afl'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980). In Exadaktilos, the
plaintiff obtained a 20% interest in a restaurant business as a gift from his father-in-law.
The facts indicated that the gift was made so that the plaintiff could learn the restaurant
business and eventually take part in management. Thereafter, the plaintiff was discharged
from employment with the corporation for apparent cause. Upon his discharge, the plaintiff
began a proceeding to dissolve the corporation on the grounds of oppressive conduct prac-
ticed upon the minority by those in control of the corporation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1981). In determining whether oppressive conduct was present, the
court noted:
The special circumstances, arrangements and personal relationships that fre-
quently underly the formation of close corporations generate certain expectations
among the shareholders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs, in-
cluding management and earnings. These expectations preclude the drawing of
any conclusions about the impact of a particular course of corporate conduct on a
shareholder without taking into consideration the role that he is expected to play.
Accordingly, a court must determine initially the understanding of the parties in
this regard. Armed with this information, the court can then decide whether the
controlling shareholders have acted in a fashion that is contrary to this under-
standing or in the language of the statute, "have acted oppressively. . . toward
one or more minority shareholders."
167 N.J. Super. at.154-55, 400 A.2d at 561. In this particular instance, however, the exis-
tence of disappointed expectations did not establish oppressive conduct by those in control
of the corporation. The court found that the plaintiff's opportunity for employment with the
corporation was lost through no fault of the controlling interests but rather as the result of
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
ing, the court no doubt sent tremors through majority shareholders
who until then felt relatively secure in their treatment of the
minority.
The petitioner in Topper fell almost squarely within Professor
O'Neal's concept of an oppressed minority shareholder. Together
with two other participants, the petitioner agreed to become a one-
third shareholder in each of two corporations operating separate
pharmacies. Additionally, he expected to become actively involved
in the management of the businesses, and relying upon his expec-
tations, terminated his existing employment of 25 years, moved his
family from Florida to New York, invested his life savings in the
venture, executed personal guarantees of a corporate lease exten-
sion, and delivered certain promissory notes to finance the acquisi-
tion of part of his stock from another participant.125 The partici-
pants entered into various shareholder agreements relating to the
ventures. The court noted, however, that the agreements did not
specify the petitioner's expectations or specifically set forth the
terms of his employment.12 Nonetheless, the petitioner was recog-
nized as having been the most active participant in the venture.127
Less than 1 year after the formation of the corporations, the
allegedly oppressive conduct took place. Acting in their capacities
as directors, the other two shareholders joined forces to discharge
the petitioner as an employee, to terminate his salary, to remove
him as a corporate officer and as signatory to corporate bank ac-
counts, and to change the locks on the corporate offices. As one
might have expected, the corporations were not paying dividends,
and thus the petitioner's termination removed all opportunity for a
return on his investment.128 Despite their actions, the controlling
shareholders argued that the petitioner's ownership interest had
not been harmed since he remained a one-third owner of the cor-
porations. Moreover, the shareholders contended that because they
the plaintiff's unsatisfactory conduct. Moreover, the plaintiff's expectation of participation
in management was defeated by his failure to meet a condition precedent to such participa-
tion. Id. at 156, 400 A.2d at 561-62.
125 107 Misc. 2d at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62. After his discharge the petitioner failed
to make a payment due on the promissory notes. As a result, the petitioner was sued on the
note by one of the other shareholders in the venture. Id., 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
2I Id. at 26-27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
127 Id. at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at. 362. Notably, one of the other shareholders was compared
to a silent partner.
128 Prior to his discharge, the petitioner's salary had risen, in 1 year, from $30,000 to
$75,000. Id.
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had discharged the petitioner justifiably, their conduct could not
result in a statutory dissolution based upon allegations of oppres-
sive conduct.129
Initially, the court considered an acceptable definition for the
term "oppressive" as used in section 1104-a. Recognizing the
dearth of legislative history surrounding the enactment of the stat-
ute, the court nonetheless observed that the sponsors of the legisla-
tion were influenced by Professor O'Neal's writings, particularly
his formulation of the reasonable expectations test for majority op-
pression.130 Furthermore, the court noted the similarity and special
nature of the relationship between shareholders in a close corpora-
tion and partners in a partnership. 3 1 More specifically, the court
posited that minority shareholders in a close corporation typically
expect to participate in management and operations and anticipate
that a return on their investment may take the form of salary de-
rived from their employment by the corporation. While these ex-
pectations may not be formalized in the corporate charter, bylaws,
or shareholder agreements, the court stated that they may consti-
tute the parties' bargain for purposes of determining the existence
of oppressive conduct.13 2 Since the shareholders' understandings at
the time of formation of the corporations were undisputed, the
court concluded that the majority's actions harmed the petitioner's
reasonable expectations, constituted a freeze out of the petitioner's
interest in the business, and thus were oppressive within the mean-
ing of section 1104-a.
In addition to equating damaged expectations to oppressive
conduct, the court made several noteworthy observations. First,
the court commented that oppressive conduct is not synonymous
with illegal or fraudulent conduct, but could be established by ac-
tions which are burdensome, harsh, or merciless. 33 Also, observed
129 Id. at 26, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
130 Id. at 31-32, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
Id. at 32-33, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (citing Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d
543, 552, 255 N.E.2d 713, 718, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454, 461 (1969), discussed in text accompanying
notes 74-79 supra); Weiss v. Gordon, 32 App. Div. 2d 279, 281, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (1st
Dep't 1969); In re Voluntary Dissolution of Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 716,
182 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463 (Sup. Ct. Erie County), modified, 9 App. Div. 2d 861, 193 N.Y.S.2d 34
(4th Dep't 1959).
132 107 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
.3 Id. at 34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365. In this regard, the court noted the employment by
American courts of the English definition of oppressive conduct as "burdensome, harsh and
wrongful conduct" or "a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of the company to the
prejudice of some of its members." Id. (quoting Scottish Corp. Wholesale Inc. v. Meyer,
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the court, an examination of oppressive conduct should not be con-
fined merely to the effect of the conduct on the petitioner in his
role as shareholder.13 4 Indeed, the court interpreted section 1104-
a(b)(2), which directs the judiciary to consider protection of the
"rights and interests" of the petitioner,135 as encompassing all as-
pects of the original expectations of the aggrieved shareholder. Of
possibly greater significance, the court, without elaboration, found
that the justification for the discharge of the petitioner was irrele-
vant.136 Accordingly, a court adopting the Topper rationale need
not concern itself with allegations of wrongdoing by the petitioner
except insofar as such wrongdoing might have an indirect effect on
the valuation of the petitioner's ownership interests for purposes of
a section 1118 buy-out election.
Armed with Topper's liberal interpretation of section 1104-a,
minority shareholders could be expected to display a willingness to
use the section to redress their grievances. In fact, shortly after
Topper, the same court in In re Beshari3 7 considered and denied a
motion to dismiss a section 1104-a petition on the ground that it
failed to state a cause of action. Beshar involved a dispute that
had raged for some 23 years. In 1957, petitioner, the owner of ap-
proximately thirty percent of the stock of a family-owned corpora-
tion, was discharged for alleged good cause. Thereafter, he insti-
tuted several lawsuits primarily directed at obtaining information
as to the financial condition and affairs of the corporation. His ef-
forts, however, were resisted due to his involvement in a competing
business and alleged lack of good faith. During the period subse-
quent to petitioner's ouster, he was excluded from participation in
corporate affairs and received no financial remuneration from the
corporation in the form of salary or other benefits. The majority
[1959] 3 All E.R. 66, 86). See also Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co., 179 Misc. 749,
754-55, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69, 73 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afl'd, 266 App. Div. 725, 41 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1st Dep't 1943).
12, 107 Misc. 2d at 34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
126 See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1104-a(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
126 The court stated:
Whether the controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause or in
their good business judgment is irrelevant. The Court finds that the undisputed
understanding of the parties was such at the time of the formation of the corpora-
tions that the respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioner's reasonable
expectations and constitute a freeze-out of petitioner's interest; consequently, they
are deemed to be "oppressive" within the statutory framework.
107 Misc. 2d at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
137 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
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shareholders totally controlled the board of directors and no divi-
dends were paid on the corporation's stock. In sum, petitioner's
interest in the corporation had been "effectively rendered
meaningless.'-3
Undaunted by the years of frustrated efforts to protect his
ownership interest, and free of his former interest in the alleged
competing business," 9 the petitioner sought dissolution of the cor-
poration on grounds of (1) waste and looting of corporate assets by
those in control' 40 and (2) illegal, fraudulent and oppressive acts
toward the petitioner by officers and directors.14 ' In moving for
dismissal, the respondents argued that the petitioner's allegations
were baseless. The Beshar court, however, noted that serious ques-
tions existed as to whether the respondents deliberately attempted
to freeze out the petitioner from participation in corporate profits.
Moreover, issues of oppressive conduct and looting of assets were
sharply contested by the parties and were not capable of summary
determination. Accordingly, the respondents' motion was denied
and the corporation was directed to comply with the disclosure
provisions of section 1106 of the BCL. 42
In reaching its decision, the Beshar court placed substantial
emphasis on the allegation of oppressive conduct. After favorably
citing Topper, the court commented that the most difficult aspect
of applying section 1104-a is arriving at a definition for oppression.
While rloting that oppression may exist in the absence of misman-
agement or misapplication of funds, the court recognized that op-
pression previously had been judicially defined to encompass a lack
of fair dealing and probity. 43 Presumably as an illustration of op-
pression, the court further noted that the removal of a minority
138 Id.
"3' At the time of the suit, the petitioner's status as an alleged competitor was not in
issue. Petitioner had retired and had disposed of his business either through sale or transfer
to his son. Id.
140 The allegations of waste and looting centered on payment of excessive salaries to the
majority shareholders, a contract to pay $20,000 upon the death or retirement of one of the
majority shareholders, and improper adjustments of income, expenses, inventories, and
financial records of the corporation by the majority shareholders. Id. at 6, col. 2.
41 The petitioner alleged that corporate earnings had been understated in order to
avoid dividend payments to him, that he had been frustrated in his efforts as a shareholder
to obtain meaningful corporate financial information, and that improper record keeping and
accounting practices had been resorted to in order to prevent him from sharing in corporate
profits. Id.
142 Id. at 6, col. 3; see notes 110-111 and accompanying text supra.
,3 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
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shareholder from office, employment, and access to information
constituted examples of freeze-out techniques.
Recently, the same court was presented with yet another op-
portunity to apply section 1104-a. In In re Taines,'" Justice Leh-
ner, who as a legislator had served as lead sponsor of the bill which
led to the adoption of sections 1104-a and 1118,145 considered a
dissolution petition brought by a one-third owner of a photo
processing business. The corporation was owned equally by three
families, with a son of each family intended to be an operating em-
ployee thereof and each father expected to supervise the busi-
ness. 146 Within one year after incorporation of the business, the pe-
titioner and his son were removed as officers and employees. A new
board of directors, excluding the petitioner and his son, was
elected, and corporate employees were informed that all operations
were to be conducted by members of the remaining two families.147
Alleging that the majority's conduct was oppressive in that it had
effectively frozen the petitioner and his son out of participation in
the business, the petitioner commenced the instant proceeding.148
After setting forth the applicable statutory provisions, Justice
Lehner noted that the sections may represent "legislative recogni-
tion.. . that the relationship among shareholders of [close] corpo-
rations approximates that among partners.1 49 The court further
stated that the petitioning shareholder seeking dissolution under
section 1104-a need only establish sufficient stock ownership and
the presence of one of the grounds for dissolution specified in the
statute.150 Recognizing that the petitioner had chosen to base his
petition upon the ground of oppressive conduct, the court cited ap-
provingly the reasonable expectations test of Professor O'Neal and
the court's decisions in Topper and Beshar.151 As the undisputed
facts indicated that the majority had eliminated "petitioner and
his son from the active operation of the [c]orporation in which
they had participated, and in which they had every reasonable ex-
144 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
145 Id. at 542-43.
"s Id. at 541.
147 Id.
148 Id.
1'9 Id. at 543 (citing In re Gordon & Weiss Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839
(1st Dep't 1969)).
150 444 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
,51 Id. The court also cited with approval Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370
Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
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pectation of being able to continue to participate," oppressive con-
duct within the meaning of section 1104-a was established.152 A
stay of the proceeding was to be granted, however, in light of the
corporation's offer to purchase petitioner's shares at their fair
value pursuant to section 1118.153
Through their interpretations of section 1104-a, the Topper,
Beshar and Taines decisions have taken substantial and admirable
steps toward remedying the heretofore powerless position of mi-
nority shareholders. Based upon these decisions, one may readily
anticipate that continued application of the reasonable expecta-
tions test may result in an increase in dissolution litigation. Hence,
renewed attention and constructive criticism relating to the
mechanics of sections 1104-a and 1118 appear warranted. The fol-
lowing section considers the potential shortcomings of the existing
statutory scheme and suggests possible means whereby these
shortcomings can be corrected.
STATUTORY SHORTCOMINGS AND SUGGESTED REvISIONS
Section 1104-a
1. Defining Oppressive Actions
Legislatures of numerous jurisdictions have enacted measures
explicitly empowering courts to dissolve closely held corporations
upon the ground of oppressive conduct practiced upon minority in-
terests."' The majority of these statutes, like section 1104-a of the
152 444 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
153 Id.
1' See note 87 supra; note 166 and accompanying text infra. Illinois was the first juris-
diction to enact an "oppressive conduct" statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981-1982). The statute gives the circuit courts the power to liquidate a corpo-
ration in an action by a shareholder when the directors or the controlling interests act, inter
alia, in an oppressive manner. Id. at § 157.86(3). The leading Illinois case on what conduct
rises to the level of oppressiveness is Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566,
141 N.E.2d 45 (1957). In Central Standard, the shareholder seeking dissolution was the
owner of preferred stock on which no dividends had been paid in over 25 years. Id. at 568-
69, 141 N.E.2d at 47. The shareholder claimed that, in light of the corporation's operating
history, it would never make a sufficient profit to pay the $1,051,800 of accumulated divi-
dends on the preferred stock. Id. It was further claimed that the failure to liquidate in a
situation where only the holders of the common stock could profit amounted to oppressive
conduct. Id. at 572, 141 N.E.2d at 49. The court noted that "oppressiveness" did not neces-
sarily imply fraud, mismanagement, or misapplication of funds. It was also stated that an
"imminent disaster" was not necessary for a finding of oppressiveness and that such a find-
ing could result from a "continuing course of conduct." Id. at 573-74, 141 N.E.2d at 50. The
court, however, denied dissolution because the corporation showed a prospect of gain. In so
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BCL, are patterned after section 97(a)(2) of the Model Business
Corporation Act, which permits dissolution at the behest of a
shareholder when it is established "[t]hat the acts of the directors
or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent. ' 155 In a few jurisdictions, similar statutes providing for
involuntary dissolution are less specific as to the grounds warrant-
ing such action. The California and Minnesota enactments, for ex-
ample, permit involuntary dissolution when the acts of those in
control have been persistently unfair toward minority sharehold-
ers.15 6 In Connecticut, dissolution may be had whenever "any good
holding, the court focused upon the increase in gross income, the possibility of a more
favorable operating arrangement, and the major improvements made on the property. Id. at
575-76, 141 N.E.2d at 50-51.
A case in which a course of conduct was held to rise to the level of oppressive conduct is
Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 IlM. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (App.
Ct. 1972). In Compton, the president of a closely held corporation did not call meetings to
discuss the management with minority shareholders, responded in an arrogant manner when
questioned about an increase in his salary, and reacted dilatorily to minority shareholder
requests. Id. at 499, 285 N.E.2d at 581. In affirming an order of dissolution, the court stated
that the "arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed course of conduct of the defendant"
amounted to the practice of oppressive conduct. Id. at 499, 285 N.E.2d at 581.
Recently, in Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 IlM. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (App. Ct.
1980), an Illinois court reiterated the position that oppressiveness can result from a course
of conduct. In Notzke, the minority shareholder alleged conspiratorial action aimed at his
control over corporate matters. Id. at 299, 405 N.E.2d at 843. In affirming a judgment of
dissolution, the court relied on the "overbearing and heavy-handed" language of the
Compton decision. Id. at 299, 405 N.E.2d at 843.
It is apparent from the above cases that the Illinois courts will not require a showing of
imminent loss in order to grant a dissolution upon the ground of oppressive conduct. A
course of conduct over a period of time will be sufficient. No clear guidelines, however, have
been promulgated by the Illinois courts as to just what course of conduct rises to the level of
oppressiveness. Indeed, the courts apparently have recognized the impracticality of setting
forth such guidelines and have seemingly resolved the "oppressive conduct" issue on a case-
by-case basis. Notably, for instance, the court in Gray v. Hall, 10 M1. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 295
N.E.2d 506, 509 (App. Ct. 1973), observed that conduct which would be oppressive in one
situation may not be oppressive in another.
"I ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 97(a)(2) (1979). The statutory basis for this sec-
tion of the Model Business Corporation Act was the Illinois Business Corporation Act. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1933) (amended 1971). See Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
'56 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (Deering 1977); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49 (West
1969). California's statute provides, as one of several grounds for involuntary dissolution,
that "[t]hose in control of the corporation have been guilty of or have knowingly counte-
nanced... persistent unfairness toward any shareholders." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4)
(Deering 1977). Similarly, the Minnesota statute provides:
A corporation may be dissolved by involuntary proceedings in the discretion of the
court when it is made to appear:
(3) That the directors or those m control of the corporation have been guilty of
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and sufficient reason" exists. 5 7
* ..persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49 (West 1969). Unfortunately, there is little guidance available as
to the interpretation of "persistent unfairness." In a legislative committee comment, it was
stated that one of the purposes of the California provision allowing involuntary dissolution
was to "provide close corporation shareholders with a remedy in the event of hardship or in
the case of oppression on the part of the management." Legislative Committee Comment
(1975), reprinted in CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800, at 582 (West 1977). This statement, which
employs the equally ambiguous terms "hardship" and "oppression," fails to provide any
clues as to the practical application of "persistent unfairness." Moreover, the case law on
this issue is sparse. In Buss v. J.O. Martin Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Ct.
App. 1966), the court found that there were sufficient facts to establish a right to involun-
tary dissolution on the grounds of persistent mismanagement and persistent unfairness. Id.
at 135-36, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15. Among the allegations which the court found were sup-
portive of a finding of persistent unfairness were that the defendant "deprived plaintiffs of
access to books and records; that he used the money of the Corporation to pay excessive
salaries to himself; and that as a result of his conduct of the business the actual value of
plaintiff's [sic] investment has deteriorated." Id. at 135, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 214. Cf..In re Hed-
berg-Freidheim & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 537, 47 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1951) (allegation of dead-
lock and persistent unfairness in that the defendant consistently vetoed plaintiff's sugges-
tion, would only speak to plaintiff at formal meetings, expressed his hostilities to
corporation's employees, etc.).
It has been noted that the protection of minority shareholders would be enhanced by an
expansive interpretation of "persistent unfairness." Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of
the California Close Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Individual Par-
ticipants, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 865, 894 (1976). Bradley believes that "[o]f special conse-
quence would be the recognition that the majority shareholders may be acting unfairly de-
spite the fact that they are exercising literally lawful statutory majority voting prerogatives
and seemingly legitimate business judgment privileges." Id. Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, in
writing about an analogous question, namely, the standards by which to determine whether
certain corporate acts should be set aside, proposed that certain acts should give rise to an
"inference of unfairness." F. O'NEAL, "SQuEEZE-OuTs" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.07, at
607 (1975). For example, an action which would be detrimental to a minority shareholder-
plaintiff would give rise to such an inference if either:
(1) there is no legitimate business reason for the action proposed, (2) the same
legitimate business objective can be attained by an alternate plan which would not
unduly prejudice the complaining shareholder, or (3) the asserted business objec-
tive is clearly secondary in importance to the majority's purpose of improving its
position at the expense of minority shareholders.
Id.
57 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-382(b) (1981). Section 33-382(b) provides:
[T]he superior court. . . may wind up the business and affairs of such corpora-
tion . . . if in [its] discretion such remedy is under the circumstances necessary or
desirable in the interests of the parties involved or the corporation:
(1) ...when it is established that:
(v) any good and sufficient reason exists for the winding up of such corporation.
Id. Although this clause "may seem [to give] the court carte blanche to step into a corporate
muddle whenever it cares to do so," it has not been judicially interpreted as being that
broad. S. CROSS, CORPORATION LAW IN CONNECTICUT 459 (1972). In Olechny v. Thadeus Kos-
ciuszko Soc., Inc., 128 Conn. 534, 24 A.2d 249 (1942), the appellate court reversed the trial
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Notwithstanding the manifestation of legislative intent to as-
sure fairness to minority shareholders and protection against in-
jury from oppressive conduct, the enactments collectively fail to
set forth standards determinative of the availability of the dissolu-
tion remedy. Indeed, no statute, including section 1104-a, attempts
to define what is meant by oppressive actions or conduct. Although
any definition of the term may have limited utility when applied to
specific factual circumstances, such definition, at minimum, would
provide the board limits within which consideration of specific acts
by the majority may be undertaken. Accordingly, an attempt
should be made to provide guidance to the judiciary regarding
those instances wherein the legislature envisioned the existence of
oppression.
The failure to statutorily specify the context in which oppres-
sive conduct exists may effectively injure both majority and minor-
ity interests in the corporation. The potential for an unduly broad
judicial interpretation of oppression may infringe upon what would
otherwise be freedom of corporate action. The controlling interests
may unnecessarily temper their business judgment by the coercive
force of fear of dissolution at a later point in time. Although it is
recognized that the "availability of dissolution as a remedy for op-
pression is a strong deterrent to an oppressive majority,"1158 it is
equally apparent that even innocent "[d]irectors and controlling
shareholders may be forced to make their business judgments more
with an eye toward avoiding a violation of that vague standard
than toward serving the best interest of the corporation. ' 159 Recog-
court's holding that the facts were sufficient to constitute a "good and sufficient reason" for
dissolution of the corporation. Id. at 537, 24 A.2d at 253. In rejecting an expansive interpre-
tation of the clause, the court stated that "we must conclude that the legislature intended
by these general words to mean other causes of the same general nature as those mentioned
[fraud, collusion, waste, etc.] and such as are recognized on general equitable principles to
be grounds for the appointment of receivers and dissolution of corporations." Id. at 539, 24
A.2d at 252 (citations omitted). See Sheehy v. Barry, 87 Conn. 656, 662, 89 A. 259, 262
(1914) ("[w]hat will be a good and sufficient reason must be left to the good judgment of the
court"); cf. Krall v. Krall, 141 Conn. 325, 335, 106 A.2d 165, 169 (1954) (receiver appointed;
facts furnished "good and sufficient reason").
158 J. O'NEML, OPPRESSION IN THE CLOSE CORPORAUON 612 (1971).
" Note, Corporate Dissolution for Illegal, Oppressive or Fraudulent Acts: The Mary-
land Solution, 28 MD. L. REv. 360, 372 (1968). The availability of dissolution of the corpora-
tion upon petition by the minority shareholders may be seen as a marked disadvantage of
the close corporation form of business enterprise. The courts have indicated that "actions
which might not be oppressive under one set of circumstances would be oppressive under
others." Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 MIl. App. 3d 294, 300, 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (App. Ct.
1980) (citations omitted). Thus, there is a possibility of a broad interpretation of thia
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nition of the legislative desire to protect minority shareholders and
the inherent danger of a broad judicial construction of oppression
may cause directors to accede to demands of the minority to avoid
the potential consequences of a dissolution proceeding. Indeed,
"the absence of a precise legislative standard. . . may even permit
a new variety of 'strike suit.' ,60
The absence of a standard for oppressive conduct is equally
problematical for the minority. The judiciary traditionally has ex-
hibited a reluctance to intervene in internal corporate affairs.' 6 1
Such undue deference to the right of the majority to control corpo-
rate conduct, or judicial prejudice in favor of the continued exis-
tence of a profitable venture, may serve to prevent dissolution de-
spite statutory authorization and minority protestations. In the
absence of meaningful legislative guidance respecting the intended
scope of oppression, as employed in the dissolution statutes, a
court's adherence to the precepts of majority rule and business
judgment may obviate the potential benefits of the legislation. Not
surprisingly, the failure of the first "oppressive conduct" statute,
section 210 of the English Companies Act, 162 has been attributed to
ground for dissolution. In addition to a possible "chilling effect" upon the decisions of the
majority shareholders, "the danger of broad judicial construction may have the further ef-
fect of discouraging new companies from selecting [the particular state] as their state of
incorporation." Note, supra, at 362.
110 Note, supra note 159, at 363. There is a possibility that the minority shareholders
will use the petition for dissolution as a harassment technique against the majority share-
holders. See Berger, Statutory Close or Closely Held Corporation?,11 PAC. L.J. 699, 708
(1980) ("harassment potential and annoyance resulting from the mere access to court [of
minority shareholders should be considered prior to forming a close corporation]"); Com-
ment, California's New General Corporation Law: Prospects for Minority Shareholders, 7
PAC. L.J. 706, 739 (1976) (involuntary dissolution may be "a possible squeeze technique");
Recent Decisions, Corporations: Recent Legislation Governing Involuntary Dissolution at
Suit of Shareholders, 28 CAL. L. REv. 219, 222 (1940) (possibility of "minority blackmail").
Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, downplays the possible adverse effects of involuntary dissolu-
tion upon the majority shareholders. He has reasoned that "a court should place less em-
phasis on the supposed harshness of dissolution as a remedy and grant dissolution upon a
showing of less extensive and serious acts of fraud or oppression than courts have usually
required in the past." F. O'Nm, supra note 9, § 9.05, at 589 (1975).
"' See notes 29 & 63-84 and accompanying text supra.
0 2 As early as 1848, English law permitted winding-up orders when the court deemed
such action "just and equitable." Companies Act of 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 45, § 5(8). The
reluctance of the courts to interfere with the internal management of a corporation and the
inability of the courts to fashion relief other than winding-up, however, put the oppressed
minority shareholder in a precarious position. See MacDougall v. Gardiner, 1 Ch. D. 13, 25
(Ch. App. 1875), wherein the court stated:
[I]f the thing complained of is a thing which in substance the majority ... are
entitled to do, or if something has been done irregularly which the majority...
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
the judiciary according unwarranted weight to the principle of ma-
jority rule.163
To relieve these potential inequities, legislative attention
should be directed toward formulating a practical statutory stan-
dard to be used by courts in intervening on the basis of oppressive
conduct. Presently, the standard of oppressive actions as a ground
for dissolution remains vague and elusive notwithstanding the ex-
isting statutory admonitions given to the courts, namely, that in
determining whether to decree dissolution a New York court is di-
rected to consider (1) whether liquidation is the only feasible
means whereby the petitioners may obtain a fair return on their
investment and (2) whether such liquidation is reasonably neces-
sary to protect the rights and interests of the petitioners.' Curi-
are entitled to do regularly,. . . there can be no use in having litigation about it,
the ultimate end of which is only that a meeting has to be called, and then ulti-
mately the majority gets its wishes.
Id.; cf. Burland v. Earle, [1902] A.C. 83, 93 ("[i]t is an elementary principle of the law...
that the Court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within
their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so"). To remedy the deficiencies of the
common-law relief, therefore, the Committee on Company Law Amendment in 1945 recom-
mended an alternative remedy to winding-up in cases of oppression. Board of Trade, Report
of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, CMD. No. 6659, at 30, 95 (1945). The spe-
cific recommendations are embodied in section 210 of the Companies Act of 1948, which
provides in part:
(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (including
himself) or, in a case falling within [§ 169(3)] of this Act, the Board of Trade, may
make an application to the court by petition for an order under this section.
(2) If on any such petition the court is of the opinion-
(a) that the company's affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; and
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice that part of
the members, but otherwise the facts would justify the making of a
winding-up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the
company should be wound up;
the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make
such order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's
affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company
by other members of the company or by the company and, in the case of a
purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's capital,
or otherwise.
Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12, Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
For a discussion on section 210, see F. O'NEAL, "SQuE Z-OuTs" OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS § 9.12, at 624-36 (1975); Afterman, supra note 16, at 1044-47; Prentice, Protection
of Minority Shareholders Section 210 of the Companies Act 1948, 25 CURRENT LEGAL PROB.
124 (1972); Rajak, The Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 35 MOD. L. REv. 156 (1972).
163 J. O'Neill, supra note 158, at 581.
164 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The courts, often
reluctant to grant the remedy of dissolution, may consider appropriate alternative relief.
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ously, it is only in the context of oppressive actions where section
1104-a can be accused of ambiguity. The grounds for dissolution
premised upon illegal or fraudulent actions or looting, waste or di-
version of corporate assets are readily understandable.
Accordingly, oppressive conduct should be defined and, for
this purpose, it is submitted that the reasonable expectations
test165 be adopted either through statutory amendment or contin-
ued judicial utilization. To the extent a minority shareholder's ex-
pectations with respect to employment, offices held, and director-
ships are frustrated by the controlling faction, an avenue for
withdrawal of his interest should be available. Defining the nature
of the wrongful conduct in this manner would not only clarify the
degree of abuse necessary to justify judicial intervention, but
would also accurately reflect the realities intrinsic in a typical in-
vestment in a closely held corporation. Thus, the reasonable expec-
tations concept coupled with the existing elements which are statu-
torily mandated to be considered by a court should ensure
equitable treatment for all those concerned with the dissolution
proceeding.
2. Standing to Petition for Dissolution
Section 1104-a is also troublesome because of its unduly re-
strictive standing requirements. Unlike similar statutes enacted in
several jurisdictions,"6 " New York's statute requires the petitioners,
This may include the appointment of a receiver, the issuance of an injunction against fur-
ther oppressive conduct, or an order of an accounting. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 357 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n.12
(W. Va. 1980). The Fix and Masinter decisions enumerate ten possible equitable remedies
and cite cases illustrating these remedies. In granting these alternate remedies, the courts
recognize that "relief for an oppressed minority does not have to be an all-or-nothing mat-
ter; elimination of one evil should not be an occasion for the substitution of another." Note,
supra note 8, at 425.
105 See notes 114-122 and accompanying text supra.
168 The following statutes require no specified percentage share ownership as a prereq-
uisite to commencement of dissolution preceedings based upon oppressive conduct. ALASKA
STAT. § 10.05.540 (1962 & 1980 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-908 (1980); COLO. Rzv. STAT. §
7-26-111 (1980 Supp.); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-97 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.94 (1962 & 1981-1982 Supp.); MD. CORPS. &
AsS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-602 (1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 21.200(825)(1) (1974); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-3-193 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485 (Vernon 1966); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 15-2290 (1947 & 1977 Supp.); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2096 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:12-7(a) (West 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16 (1976); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2107A(2) (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90 (1980); S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a)(4)
(1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-7-34 (1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7.05
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in the aggregate, to satisfy a specified ownership requirement as a
prerequisite to their suit. Section 1104-a authorizes commence-
ment of a dissolution proceeding only by "[t]he holders of twenty
percent or more of all outstanding shares of a corporation. e16 7 Un-
doubtedly, the legislature in incorporating this standing require-
ment intended to protect against the potential for frivolous or
strike suits. Nonetheless, it is difficult to justify foreclosing the sec-
tion 1104-a remedy to a ten, five, or even one percent shareholder
who has been subjected to harm by the illegal, fraudulent, or
oppressive actions of the majority, while providing the remedy to a
twenty percent shareholder who has been victimized by identical
conduct. Even assuming that there is a theoretical basis for the
percentage requirement, the majority should have only minor com-
plaint upon its deletion. Presumably, a petitioning shareholder
who holds little of the corporate stock will be a prime target for a
section 1118 buy-out by the corporation or the non-petitioning
shareholders since, relatively speaking, the outlay for such
purchase would be minimal.
The ownership requirement may be further criticized as incon-
sistent with the general trend to treat the close corporation in a
manner akin to its partnership counterpart. The Uniform Partner-
ship Act, as adopted in New York, provides that dissolution of a
partnership may be caused at any time by the express will of any
partner, regardless of the relative ownership interest of such part-
ner.6 e Moreover, such dissolution at will may result even in those
instances where the partner's action represents a breach of the
partnership agreement.169 Notwithstanding this relative freedom of
action given to all partners in a dissolution context, the New York
legislature has seen fit to adopt a percentage ownership require-
ment for purposes of section 1104-a. Curiously, there appears to be
A(1)(c) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92 (1953 & Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2067 (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-94 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41 (1975); WASH. REV.
CODE § 23A.28.170 (1974); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-614 (1977).
107 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
100 N.Y. PARTNERSHip LAW § 62 (McKinney 1948).
100 Id. § 62(2) provides:
Dissolution is caused:
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circum-
stances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by
the express will of any partner at any time ....
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no overriding public policy applicable to corporate entities which
requires the section 1104-a ownership approach. For example, New
York has sanctioned dissolution upon the demand of any share-
holder when such right is embodied in the certificate of incorpora-
tion. 170 Accordingly, the twenty percent ownership requirement
should be removed as a prerequisite to shareholder standing under
section 1104-a. Thus, any shareholder suffering the oppressive con-
duct of those in control of the corporation will have the ability to
seek return of his financial interest in the business.
An additional, but less significant, drawback associated with
section 1104-a is the requirement that the shareholders instituting
the proceeding must be "entitled to vote in an election of direc-
tors."'" Thus, protection that would otherwise be afforded by the
section is removed from holders of non-voting common and pre-
ferred stock. Assuming that these parties are able to establish that
their reasonable expectations relating to the corporation have been
frustrated by those in control, there is no apparent justification for
treating them differently from their voting colleagues. Fortunately,
this inequity should remain of more theoretical than practical con-
cern since it is unlikely that the capital structure of the typical
close corporation will include non-voting stock. Furthermore, if
such stock does exist, it may be unlikely that the holders reasona-
bly expected to actively participate in the operation and manage-
ment of the business. Still, the possibility does exist that non-vot-
ing shareholders will be subjected to the abuses envisioned in
section 1104-a. Consequently, it seems overly protective of the con-
trolling interests to deny the benefits of section 1104-a to the in-
jured solely on the basis of their non-voting status.
If the current standing requirements of section 1104-a remain
intact, a further issue may arise concerning the continued ability of
less than twenty-percent shareholders and non-voting shareholders
to petition for involuntary dissolution on the basis of "judicial
sponsorship."'1 2 Should section 1104-a be construed as preempting
7I N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002(a) (McKinney 1963), in pertinent part, provides:
(a) The certificate of incorporation may contain a provision that any shareholder,
or the holders of any specified number or proportion of shares, or of any specified
number or proportion of shares of any class or series thereof, may require the
dissolution of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event.
171 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
12 See notes 51-84 and accompanying text supra. Professor Hornstein, in his commen-
tary on the Business Corporation Law, raised the issue of whether Leibert v. Clapp, 13
N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963), will be "nullified and relief barred to
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the area of dissolution upon the demand of the minority, those ag-
grieved shareholders who do not satisfy the standing requirements
of section 1104-a would be left without a dissolution remedy. Such
an inequitable result surely was not envisioned by the enactment
of section 1104-a. Indeed, the intent of the legislation was to en-
hance, not curtail, the rights of the minority. 7 3 Therefore, the ju-
dicial remedies created by Leibert v. Clapp' 4 and its progeny
should retain continued viability for those minority shareholders
who lack standing to employ section 1104-a. Unfortunately, those
shareholders may find little practical comfort in seeking to apply
the inherent equity power of a court to decree dissolution.17 5
3. The Wrongdoing Petitioner
An additional difficulty arising from section 1104-a is the un-
certain status of a wrongdoing petitioner, that is, a minority share-
holder who has been ousted from employment and managerial re-
sponsibility for cause. Presently, the BCL makes no attempt to
differentiate this shareholder from any other shareholder using the
remedy afforded by section 1104-a. Furthermore, the Topper deci-
sion deems any justification for the frustrated reasonable expecta-
tions of a shareholder to be irrelevant insofar as the applicability
of section 1104-a is concerned.17 6 Accordingly, a petitioner's right
to dissolution may be unaffected by his own wrongdoing. New
Jersey, however, in applying the reasonable expectations test, has
proven less liberal in its view of the wrongdoer and has concluded
that the wrongdoer's expectations may be frustrated by his own
impropriety rather than by the acts of the majority.177 In such in-
stances, dissolution pursuant to an oppressive conduct standard
has been denied.
The culpability of the petitioner should be of some concern to
a deserving shareholder who owns less than 20% of the outstanding shares." N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw app. 1, at 127-28 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (Hornstein, Supplementary Anal-
ysis of Business Corporation Law).
173 See Memorandum of Assemblyman Finneran, reprinted in [1979] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN.
143-44; note 85 supra.
174 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963).
175 See notes 53-84 and accompanying text supra.
176 In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1980).
177 See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554
(1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980). For a discussion of Exadaktilos, see
note 124 supra.
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a court in considering dissolution. Therefore, the approach es-
poused in Topper appears overly simplistic and inequitable to
those in control of the business. Removing the dissolution remedy
in toto from a wrongdoing petitioner, however, may be equally
harsh. For example, the petitioner's actions, while constituting suf-
ficient cause for his discharge, may have resulted in damage to the
corporation which is minimal when translated into monetary
terms. Nevertheless, if the transgression is deemed sufficient to re-
move the section 1104-a remedy, the petitioner may be unable to
recoup any portion of his investment in the business. The silence
of the New York statute on this matter is particularly perplexing
in that one can assume that those in control will invariably at-
tempt to justify their otherwise oppressive actions by alleging some
wrongdoing on the part of the petitioner. A solution to the prob-
lem, balancing the liberality of the Topper approach with the re-
straint of the New Jersey courts, appears warranted.
Not surprisingly, a compromise position is suggested by re-
course to the Uniform Partnership Act as adopted in New York.
As previously indicated, section 62 of the New York Partnership
Act states that dissolution of a partnership may be caused by the
"express will of any partner at any time," notwithstanding the
agreed term of the partnership as set forth in the partnership
agreement. 178 In such an event, however, the partners who have
not breached the agreement may elect to continue the business for
its agreed term179 or liquidate the business and proceed against the
wrongdoer for damages resulting from the breach. 80 Should the
"I N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 62 (McKinney 1948).
119 Section 69(2)(b) of the New York Partnership Law provides:
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire
to continue the business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly with
others, may do so, during the agreed term for the partnership and for that pur-
pose may possess the partnership property, provided they secure the payment by
bond approved by the court, or pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully, the value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any
damages recoverable under clause (II) of paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this
section, and in like manner indemnify him against all present or future partner-
ship liabilities.
Id. § 69(2)(b).
180 Section 69(2)(a) provides:
2. When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership agreement the
rights of the partners shall be as follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have,
(I) All the rights specified in subdivision one of this section [i.e., liquidation] and
(II) The right, as against each partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully,
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other partners continue the business, they must either pay the
wrongdoing partner in cash for the value of his interest, less any
damages caused to his copartners by the dissolution and without
consideration of the value of the goodwill of the business, or post a
court-approved bond ensuring such payment at the end of the
agreed term for the business. 81 Thus, the wrongdoing partner is
able to remove, or receive security for, the value of his interest in
the firm, but is penalized for the damage he has caused by improp-
erly inflicting dissolution upon his colleagues. Additionally, the
wrongdoer is prevented from sharing in the goodwill of the contin-
uing business-a result which is equitable since, if the business
had been liquidated, any goodwill would have been lost to all own-
ers absent sale of the business in its entirety.
Application of these partnership principles to a wrongdoer in
the section 1104-a context would result in equitable treatment of
all concerned. Should the corporation be liquidated on a piecemeal
basis, the court would be required to ascertain the damages caused
to the non-petitioning shareholders by a petitioner's wrongful con-
duct. Admittedly, such damage may be in excess of the direct harm
caused to the corporation which formed the basis for the peti-
tioner's discharge. Also, damages may be difficult to compute in a
liquidation context since they must include valuation of the non-
petitioning shareholders' expectations which were frustrated due to
the liquidation. Nonetheless, the court in its discretion should be
able to garner a reasonable estimate of loss to the non-petitioning
shareholders. Should the corporation be sold in its entirety as a
going concern or be continued pursuant to a section 1118 buy-out
of petitioner's shares, difficulties in valuation would exist but again
should not be insurmountable. Using independent appraisals, the
to damages for breach of the agreement.
Id. § 69(2)(a).
181 Section 69(2)(c), in pertinent part, provides:
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
(II) If the business is continued under paragraph (b) of subdivision two of this
section the right as against his copartners and all claiming through them in re-
spect of their interest in the partnership, to have the value of his interest in the
partnership, less any damages caused to his copartners by the dissolution, ascer-
tained and paid to him in cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the
court, and to be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in
ascertaining the value of the partner's interest the value of the good-will of the
business shall not be considered.
Id. § 69(2)(c)
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court would first determine the fair value of corporate assets taken
individually. The court would then apply the petitioner's owner-
ship percentage to such value to arrive at the value of the peti-
tioner's interest in the assets. In such manner, the petitioner would
not share in the goodwill or going concern value, if any, of the bus-
iness. Thereafter, the court would be left to compute the damage
caused to the non-petitioning shareholders by the dissolution in-
cluding any damage resulting from frustration of their reasonable
expectations. In a section 1118 purchase situation, one measure of
the damage might be the cost to the purchasers of borrowing or
using funds necessary to purchase the ownership interest of the
petitioner, less any anticipated profit on the stock purchased. The
eventual payment to the petitioner would equal the value of his
interest, as previously determined, less the damages sustained as a
result of his wrongful conduct. As the corporation, unlike a part-
nership, would have no fixed term, the use of a bond to secure fu-
ture payment to the petitioner would not appear feasible since the
time fixed for future payment would at best be arbitrary.
4. Judicial Considerations
One final comment is in order concerning the matters that a
court is statutorily required to consider prior to ordering dissolu-
tion. In determining whether to proceed with dissolution, the court
is to consider, among other things, whether corporate liquidation
"is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may reasonably
expect to obtain a fair return on their investment."" 2 Although the
issue of alternatives to dissolution should be of concern to the
court, it is critical that courts not continue to display their reluc-
tance to decree dissolution by placing undue emphasis on this con-
sideration. Moreover, while liquidation is in all probability the only
means available for obtaining any return on the aggrieved minor-
ity's investment, establishing that such investment is, for example,
unsaleable or incapable of returning a dividend in the future may
provide the petitioner with an insurmountable evidentiary burden.
It is submitted, therefore, that once the petitioner has established
a basis for dissolution pursuant to section 1104-a, his burden of
proof should be satisfied. To the extent that alternative means for
a fair return to the petitioner may be available, it should be incum-
bent upon the corporation to establish their existence and





Having proceeded at great length to illustrate certain short-
comings within section 1104-a, it would be a dereliction to fail to
set forth some proposed solution. Accordingly, it is suggested that
section 1104-a be revised to read as follows:
(a) A shareholder of a corporation, other than a corporation
registered as an investment company under an act of congress en-
titled "Investment Company Act of 1940," no shares of which are
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or
an affiliated securities association, may present a petition for dis-
solution on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The directors or those in control of the corporation have
been guilty of illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive actions toward the
complaining shareholders;
(2) The property or assets of the corporation are being
looted, wasted, or diverted for non-corporate purposes by its di-
rectors, officers, or those in control of the corporation.
(b) The court, in determining whether to proceed with invol-
untary dissolution pursuant to this section, shall take into
account:
(1) Whether feasible means in addition to liquidation are
available whereby petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a
fair return on their investment; and
(2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonably nec-
essary for the protection of the rights and interests of any sub-
stantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners. For pur-
poses of subsection (b)(1) herein, the corporation shall bear the
burden of establishing the existence of alternative means whereby
petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their
investment.
(c) The court, in determining whether to proceed with invol-
untary dissolution pursuant to this section on the grounds of op-
pressive actions toward the complaining shareholders by the di-
rectors or those in control of the corporation, shall take into
account:
(1) Whether, among other things, the reasonable expectations
of the complaining shareholders as to employment, offices to be
held, or directorships have been frustrated by the directors or
those in control of the corporation; and
(2) Whether the conduct of the directors or those in control
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of the corporation toward the complaining shareholders may be
justified on the basis of wrongdoing on the part of the com-
plaining shareholders, provided, however, that such wrongdoing
shall not constitute a defense to involuntary dissolution pursuant
to this section but shall create a right in the non-complaining
shareholders, as against the wrongdoers, to damages for their loss
due to such wrongful conduct.
Section 1104-a, as revised, addresses each of the problem areas
previously raised-a definition for oppressive action, standing, the
wrongdoing petitioner and the burden of proof as to alternatives to
dissolution. The status of the wrongdoing petitioner in a section
1118 buy-out situation will be considered in the proposed revisions
to that section. Hopefully, the proposed solution resolves certain
issues without creating a multitude of new and more complicated
concerns.
Section 1118
1. The Offer to Purchase
In an effort to balance the rights of majority and minority in-
terests in the corporation, the legislature enacted section 1118,
which permits the non-complaining shareholders or the corpora-
tion when confronted with a section 1104-a petition to force a sale
of the petitioner's stock. The method enacted to effect this sale,
however, appears to have created certain practical problems which
may inequitably affect the minority. One of the problems resulting
from the present statute can be illustrated by the following hypo-
thetical. By an order to show cause returnable at a future date, a
petitioner commences a section 1104-a proceeding.183 Immediately
prior to the return date, the petitioner receives correspondence
from the corporation's counsel indicating that either the corpora-
tion or a non-complaining shareholder has elected to purchase the
petitioner's stock at its fair value pursuant to section 1118. Aware
of the statute, the petitioner's counsel undoubtedly will agree to an
adjournment of the return date so that the parties may attempt to
reach agreement as to the value of the petitioner's interest in the
corporation. If such negotiations break down, as they invariably
will, the statute seemingly permits two alternatives to the corpora-
183 The order to show cause may place additional burdens upon the respondent corpo-
ration. See notes 110-111 and accompanying text supra.
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tion and the prospective purchasers. First, the prospective pur-
chasers may move to stay the proceedings and have the court de-
termine the value of the petitioner's stock. 84 Alternatively, the
corporation may litigate the merits of the petitioner's contentions
under section 1104-a. If the latter course is chosen, the petitioner
will have been subjected to the extended delay occasioned by the
negotiations as to fair value without any additional recourse
against the prospective purchasers.
The plight of the petitioner on this score may be alleviated
rather effortlessly. Since section 1118 exists for the primary benefit
of those in control of the corporation and, as indicated, may work
to the detriment of the aggrieved minority, the election to
purchase pursuant to section 1118 should be of more permanent
and lasting effect. Once made, the election should remain irrevoca-
ble so as to avoid any benefit to the majority by virtue of delay
tactics. Surely, the majority, now in exclusive control of the busi-
ness, will seek all avenues of delay in the hope of forcing the peti-
tioner to accept a lesser price for his stock. This potential inequity
may be avoided by indicating the irrevocable nature of the election
in the statute and by providing that the petitioner, in addition to
the prospective purchasers, may apply to the court for a determi-
nation of the value of his stock in the event that the parties are
unable to agree voluntarily upon such value. 85
A further potential for unfairness lies in the statutory timing
for the offer to purchase. Section 1118 permits the purchase elec-
tion to be made "at any time within ninety days after the filing of
[the] petition or at such later time as the court in its discretion
may allow."18 6 Thereafter, the purchase is to be effected at the fair
value of petitioner's shares as of the day prior to the filing of the
petition18 7 and "upon such terms and conditions as may be ap-
proved by the court."' The difficulty with the timing of the offer
184 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
185 Permitting the petitioner to apply for determination of the value of his shares would
create a procedure analogous to that used when a shareholder asserts his appraisal rights
against the corporation. Pursuant to section 623 of the New York Business Corporation
Law, if the corporation and a dissenting shareholder fail to agree upon the price to be paid
for the shareholder's stock, the corporation may commence a proceeding to fix the fair value
of the shares. Should the corporation fail to institute the proceeding, any dissenting share-
holder may commence the proceeding. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h) (McKinney 1963).
186 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
187 Id. § 1118(b).
188 Id. § 1118(a).
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relates to the ability of the prospective purchasers to elect to
purchase at a point in time beyond 90 days after the petition is
filed. Conceivably, the corporation could fully litigate the merits of
the dissolution proceeding, lose and still elect, subject to court ap-
proval, to purchase the petitioner's stock. Hence, although the pe-
titioner will have expended time, effort, and money to pursue the
litigation, he will nonetheless be saddled with a mandatory sale of
his stock. 189 Moreover, the price the petitioner will receive for his
stock will be computed as of the day preceding the filing of his
petition. 190 Accordingly, if the business prospers subsequent to the
filing, the prospective purchaser, in effect, will have received an
option to purchase the shares at the earlier, lower value. Under
these circumstances, it behooves a purchaser to forego making an
early election, to litigate the merits of the petitioner's claims, and
thereafter to apply to the court for a statutory buy-out in the
event that the petitioner is successful on the merits. In keeping
with the court's traditional reluctance to order dissolution, it can
be expected that the court will permit the election at such later
date.
Several possibilities exist to alleviate, in whole or in part, the
petitioner's problem in the event of a delayed purchase election.
Using the present statutory language, the court may impose condi-
tions for the exercise of its discretion in permitting the late elec-
tion. First, when the election is made after petitioner has incurred
expenses in addition to those involved in commencing the proceed-
ing, the court may require that the purchasers reimburse the peti-
tioner for these expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees. Sec-
ond, when the business has been profitable subsequent to the
commencement of the dissolution proceeding, the court may re-
quire that the offer to purchase include an element of value corre-
sponding to what would otherwise have been the petitioner's share
18 This precise situation occurred in In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). As previously discussed, the Topper court determined that
oppressive conduct had been practiced by the controlling faction. Id. at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at
362. Nonetheless, the court considered whether the controlling shareholders had made an
election to purchase the petitioner's shares pursuant to section 1118. Since these sharehold-
ers had previously agreed to negotiate, without judicial interference, a reasonable price for
the petitioner's shares, the court deemed this conduct sufficient to constitute a statutory
election to purchase. Id. at 28-29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362. As a result, the petitioner had been
put through the expense of litigating the proceeding on the merits but was still confronted
with a section 1118 forced buy-out.
190 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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of post-petition profits had the proceeding not been commenced." 1
Assuming that these conditions are adopted by the court, any det-
riment to the petitioner or benefit to the purchasers occasioned by
the delay in the election should be removed.
2. Valuation
A somewhat less cumbersome and more certain solution to the
timing issue may be achieved by reconsidering the overall valua-
tion method used by section 1118. As previously indicated, the
value of the petitioner's shares is to be determined as of the day
prior to the filing of the petition.192 As such, the valuation is pat-
terned after the appraisal rights statutorily given, in limited cir-
cumstances, to dissenting shareholders.19 The statute, however,
provides no mechanism for compensating the petitioner who en-
counters a lapse of time between the filing of his petition and re-
ceipt of fair value for his shares. To date, one court has indicated
that certain statutory provisions which benefit a dissenting share-
holder in an appraisal context, such as the right to receive interest
on the fair value of one's shares, are not directly applicable to a
section 1118 situation.1 9 Consequently, a petitioner, through no
1'' See note 195 and accompanying text infra.
192 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1118(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
193 In the appraisal situation, if the fair value of the dissenting shareholder's stock is
not voluntarily agreed upon, the dissenting shareholder is to receive "fair value as of the
close of business on the day prior to the shareholders' authorization date, excluding any
appreciation or depreciation directly or indirectly induced by such corporate action on the
proposal." Id. § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1963). In such case, the order for the payment of
value by the corporation is to include interest from the shareholders' authorization date to
the date of payment. Id. § 623(h)(6).
1'9 In Fleischer v. Gift Pax, Inc., 79 App. Div. 2d 636, 433 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2d Dep't 1980),
the petitioner argued that subsection (g) and certain provisions of subsection (h) of section
623 of the Business Corporation Law should be applicable to a section 1118 buy-out when
the parties are unable to agree voluntarily as to the value of the petitioner's shares. Id. at
636-37, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 615. Specifically, the petitioner desired:
(1) that the corporations be required to make a written offer to purchase the peti-
tioner's shares at what they believe to be the "fair value" of the shares (see Busi-
ness Corporation Law, § 623, subd. [g]); (2) in the absence of a "bad faith" refusal
to accept the proposed terms of sale, that the petitioner be awarded interest "at
such rate as the court finds to be equitable" upon the judicially-determined fair
value of his shares (see Business Corporation Law, § 623, subd. [hi, par. [6]); (3)
again in the absence of bad faith, that the costs and expenses of the valuation
proceeding be assessed against the respondent corporation (see Business Corpora-
tion Law, § 623, subd. [hi, par. [7]); and (4) that the payment of the judicially
determined fair value of petitioner's shares take place within 60 days after the
final determination thereof (see Business Corporation Law, § 623, subd. [h], par.
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wrongdoing of his own, may be unable to recoup his investment for
an extended period of time and, throughout that time, may receive
no credit in the form of interest or profit sharing on such withheld
investment.
A possible solution to the petitioner's dilemma can be gleaned
from the existing provisions of the partnership law. When a part-
nership is continued notwithstanding dissolution caused by the re-
tirement, death, or wrongdoing of a partner, the outgoing partner
or his estate receives the value of his partnership interest as of the
date of dissolution. In addition, however, the partner is entitled to
either interest on such value to the date of payment or, at his op-
tion and in lieu of interest, "the profits attributable to the use of
his right in the property of the dissolved partnership." 195 As a re-
sult, the outgoing partner's recovery is not limited to the value of
his interest at dissolution. While his former partners get the bene-
fit of continued use of his investment after dissolution, the outgo-
ing partner receives compensation. By analogy to the partnership,
a complaining shareholder in a section 1118 context should be af-
forded similar compensation while the corporation continues to use
his investment. Such compensation, be it in the form of interest or
post-petition profit sharing, will serve to treat the aggrieved share-
holder more equitably. Moreover, the interest or profit-sharing ob-
ligation on the corporation should serve as a catalyst for an early
buy-out pursuant to section 1118 and thus remove the potential
inequities previously discussed in connection with a delayed elec-
tion under the statute.
[8]).
Id. at 636-37, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 615. Rejecting such request, the court noted no legislative
intent that the provisions of section 623 were to apply to a section 1118 buy-out. As a result,
the court deemed it "better practice to refrain from judicial legislation and await further
legislative action." Id. at 637, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 616. The court, however, did note that its
decision would not prevent a court in appropriate cases from making such orders as justice
requires. Id.
195 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 73 (McKinney 1948) provides in part:
When any partner retires ...and the business is continued under any of the
conditions set forth in . . .section sixty-nine, paragraph (b) of subdivision two
[relating to the actions of a wrongdoing partner], without any settlement of ac-
counts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership continuing the
business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative as against such
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value
of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the
option of his legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the
use of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership . . ..
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3. The Ability to Purchase
One final problem of note centers on the persons or entities
empowered to offer to purchase the petitioner's shares pursuant to
section 1118. Presently, section 1118 permits the buy-out election
to be exercised by either a non-complaining shareholder or the cor-
poration itself.196 To the extent that the corporation alone makes
the election, the petitioner runs the risk that once the value of his
shares is ascertained, the corporation may be financially incapable
of proceeding with the purchase. Section 513 of the BCL provides
that a corporation may repurchase its shares "out of surplus except
when currently the corporation is insolvent or would thereby be
made insolvent.' 1 97 Accordingly, in order to purchase petitioner's
stock, the corporation must, at the time of purchase, have a sur-
plus,198 be solvent, and not be rendered insolvent as a result of
such purchase. Insolvency is defined as the corporation's inability
to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of its busi-
ness. 9  This definition is synonymous with insolvency in the "eq-
uity" sense 00 and can be characterized 6s an excess of current lia-
bilities over current assets.20'
As is readily apparent, the surplus and solvency of a prospec-
tive corporate purchaser should be of critical significance to the
court and the petitioner.20 2 Conceivably, at the time of election the
corporation's surplus or solvency may be marginal, and a downturn
19 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
197 Id. § 513(a) (McKinney 1963).
98 Surplus is defined as "the excess of net assets over stated capital." Id. § 102(13). Net
assets refers to "the amount by which the total assets exceed the total liabilities." Id. §
102(9). Stated capital means:
the sum of (A) the par value of all shares with par value that have been issued,
(B) the amount of the consideration received for all shares without par value that
have been issued, except such part of the consideration therefor as may have been
allocated to surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (C) such amounts not
included in clauses (A) and (B) as have been transferred to stated capital, whether
upon the distribution of shares or otherwise, minus all reductions from such sums
as have been effected in a manner permitted by law.
Id. § 102(12).
1- Id. § 102(8).
200 Id. § 102, comment at 6-7.
201 See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 319, at 637 (1970).
22 Unfortunately, it appears that courts have side-stepped their responsibilities in this
regard. In In re Taines, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), the court stated:
"Establishing that the [c]orporation is legally and financially able to pay the fair value of
the shares under the limitations prescribed in [the Business Corporation Law] section 513 is
not a condition precedent to the grant of the stay mandated by section 1118." Id. at 544.
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in its financial condition may occur during the period in which the
fair value of the petitioner's stock is being determined. If such a
downturn occurs, the corporation, notwithstanding its election to
purchase and any resultant stay obtained, may be statutorily una-
ble to purchase petitioner's stock due to its lack of surplus or cur-
rent insolvency or because such purchase might otherwise cause
the corporation to become insolvent.20 3 In such a case, the peti-
tioner, after having expended time, money, and effort in the valua-
tion of his shares, may have no available alternative except to pur-
sue dissolution proceedings anew with a view toward liquidation of
the corporation. To the extent an individual shareholder elects to
purchase the petitioner's stock, his later financial inability to per-
form may similarly disappoint the petitioner's expectations.
To alleviate this situation, concern should be directed to en-
suring, to the extent practicable, that a purchase will occur once
the statutory buy-out election is exercised. Several alternatives
seem possible. First, the prospective purchaser can be required,
upon grant of the stay, to post a bond or other acceptable security
in an amount sufficient to secure the petitioner for the value of his
shares. This approach has been adopted by one court despite the
absence of express statutory authorization for such a condition
under section 1118.204 A second alternative lies in requiring that
the section 1118 election be made by both the corporation and one
or more non-complaining shareholders. For the corporation to
203 See In re Flying Mailmen Service, Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1976); Mantell v.
Unipak Aviation Corp., 28 App. Div. 2d 1134, 1134, 284 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (2d Dep't 1967).
204 In re Delinko, N.Y.L.J., April 27, 1981 at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). In De-
linko, the controlling shareholder had moved pursuant to section 1118 to purchase the peti-
tioner's shares and an appraiser had been appointed to determine fair value. In addition, a
temporary receiver of the assets and property of the corporations involved had been ap-
pointed. The controlling shareholder then moved for, among other things, an order remov-
ing the temporary receiver so that she could control the corporate assets and salvage a de-
clining business. The petitioner opposed the motion by arguing that a grant of the desired
relief would leave her with no security for the value of her shares and would provide the
controlling shareholder with an opportunity to "milk" the corporations. In granting the mo-
tion, the court noted that the petitioner's sole legal concern with the corporations, at pre-
sent, was to insure that there would be sufficient assets available to pay her the fair value of
her shares. Accordingly, it appeared appropriate to permit the prospective purchaser to con-
tinue operating the business. Notably, however, the petitioner's concern as to security was
deemed reasonable. Thus, while there was no express statutory authorization for security in
such instances, the court conditioned the grant of the motion "upon condition that movant
posts a bond or other acceptable security in an amount sufficient to secure petitioner for the
value of her shares." Id. at 6, col. 3. Such condition was deemed acceptable as furthering




make the initial election, one or more of the non-complaining
shareholders, whose financial condition is satisfactory to the court,
should be required to obligate themselves to purchase the peti-
tioner's shares to the extent the corporation may later prove
unable to do so. Similarly, for a non-complaining shareholder to
make the initial election, the corporation or other non-complaining
shareholders should be required to join in the purchase obligation
to the extent that it is later deemed necessary. While this latter
alternative will not fully secure the petitioner's position in all
events, it does bolster the position of the petitioner and increase
the likelihood of the anticipated purchase actually taking place.
Imposition of the foregoing conditions would be equitable and
consistent with section 1118. Additionally, these conditions would
afford significant protection to the petitioner by assuring that no
wrongdoing relating to corporate surplus or solvency would be
practiced by those in control of the corporation during the pen-
dency of the valuation proceeding. Failure to impose the condi-
tions will leave the petitioner in a position wherein he win have no
assurance of ever receiving the fair value of his shares despite the
judicial determination of value pursuant to section 1118.
4. Proposed Solution
Once again, having recounted the potential shortcomings of
section 1118, it is reasonable to propose concrete statutory revi-
sions. The changes suggested herein are designed in part to reduce
the inequities inherent in the present statute as they affect both
the majority and minority. Accordingly, section 1118 is proposed to
be revised to read as follows:
(a) In any proceeding brought pursuant to section eleven
hundred four-a of this chapter, any other shareholder or share-
holders or the corporation may, at any time within ninety days
after the filing of such petition or at such later time as the court
in its discretion may allow, irrevocably elect to purchase the
shares owned by the petitioners at their fair value and upon such
terms and conditions as may be approved by the court, including
the conditions of subsection (d) herein.
(b) If one or more shareholders or the corporation elect to
purchase the shares owned by the petitioner but are unable to
agree with the petitioner upon the fair value of such shares, the
court, upon the application of such prospective purchaser or pur-
chasers or the petitioner, shall stay the proceedings brought pur-
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suant to section 1104-a of this chapter and determine the fair
value of the petitioner's shares in accordance with subsection (c)
herein.
(c) For purpose of this section, the fair value of the peti-
tioner's shares shall be equal to the fair value of such shares as of
the day prior to the date on which the petition is filed, together
with interest thereon from the date of such filing or, at the peti-
tioner's option, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the
petitioner's interest in the corporation from the date of such
filing, provided, however, that if a petitioner shall be adjudged
guilty of wrongful conduct in connection with the corporation, the
value of such petitioner's shares shall be reduced by any damages
caused to the corporation or other shareholders and the value of
the goodwill of the business shall not be considered in ascertain-
ing the value of such petitioner's shares.
(d) In connection with any election to purchase pursuant to
this section:
(1) If such election is made beyond ninety days after
the filing of the petition, the court, in its discretion, may
award the petitioner his reasonable expenses incurred in
the proceeding prior to such election, including reasona-
ble attorneys' fees;
(2) For a valid election to be made by the corporation
alone, a shareholder or shareholders, found satisfactory to
the court, must consent to purchase the petitioner's
shares at their fair value to the extent the corporation
may later prove unable to do so;
(3) For a valid election to be made by a shareholder
or shareholders alone, the corporation or other sharehold-
ers found satisfactory to the court must consent to
purchase the petitioner's shares at their fair value to the
extent the electing shareholder or shareholders may later
prove unable to do so; and
(4) The court, in its discretion, may require, at any
time prior to the actual purchase of petitioner's shares,
the posting of a bond or other acceptable security in an
amount sufficient to secure petitioner for the fair value of
his shares.
Adoption of the foregoing revisions would assist the petitioner
in several respects. The suggested changes incorporate the irrevo-
cable nature of the buy-out election, the ability of the petitioner to
stay the proceedings and move for a court-ordered valuation of his
shares, a valuation technique permitting the petitioner to be com-
pensated for the continued use of his investment by the corpora-
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tion subsequent to the filing of the petition, and reasonable condi-
tions designed to ensure that a purchase will follow a section 1118
election. As for the corporation and the non-complaining share-
holders, the revisions attempt to compensate them to some extent
where their treatment of the minority has been occasioned by the
minority's own wrongful conduct. In short, the suggested changes
continue the statutory attempt to consider the position of both the
minority and majority in those instances where their interests may
no longer be reconciled amicably.
CONCLUSION
New York, like other jurisdictions which have attempted to
enhance the position of minority shareholders regarding corporate
dissolution, has produced legislation which attempts to balance the
competing interests of majority and minority shareholders. Like all
attempts at compromise of adverse positions, the net result may be
less than fully satisfactory for all parties concerned. Indeed, sec-
tions 1104-a and 1118, in fact, contain -several flaws. While revi-
sions to these sections have been suggested in this article, it would
be immodest to suppose that the legislature will act expediently to
adopt a revised statute. Nonetheless, the proposed revised sections
may serve as food for thought for courts in attempting to deal with
the vagueness and apparent inequities inherent in the present stat-
utory scheme.
Notwithstanding their shortcomings, these sections, as inter-
preted and applied in Topper and subsequent decisions, take sub-
stantial strides toward providing a meaningful dissolution remedy
to aggrieved minority shareholders. To conclude that the Topper
interpretation of "oppressive actions" is liberal with respect to the
rights of minority shareholders may well be classified as an under-
statement. To say that the statutes, as so interpreted, will open
floodgates of litigation is at present premature. Suffice it to say
that the statutes, coupled with the Topper interpretation of op-
pression, place a heretofore unavailable weapon in the limited arse-
nal of minority shareholders. Their addition is a welcome step in
recognizing the peculiar status of shareholders in a close corpora-
tion and in considering their position in a manner analogous to
partners in a partnership.
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